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I. DID COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT OFFER 
DEROGATORY AND UNTRUE STATEMENTS TO THE TRIAL 
COURT AND THEREFORE MISLEAD THE TRIAL COURTS 
AND PREJUDICE THE TRIAL COURTS BASED ON THESE 
UNTRUES 
H. DID THE TRIAL COURTS ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
ITS REMOVAL OF PETITIONERS JOINT CUSTODY OF A 
MINOR CHILD, WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND DID 
THIS TERMINATION INFLUENCE LATER CUSTODY 
PROCEEDINGS 
m. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
BIFICATING PETITIONERS DIVORCE AND WITHOUT DUE 
PROCESS OF LAW? 
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IV. DID COUNSEL_EQR THE PETITIONER ERR IKLHIS 
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VH. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE 
THE JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER WAS 
CONTRARY TO THE CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY 
AND AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHERE THE PROCESS OF 
JUSTICE HAD GONE AWRY BECAUSE OF INCOMPETENCE 
BECAUSE OF INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL THAT 
MANIFEST IN JUSTICE WILL RESULT OTHERWISE? 
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APPELANT COURT JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction Pursuant to Utah Code. Ann.78-2a-3. 
issirps PRESENTFD rmmmm fr STANPARP txFBsmm 
I. DID COUNSEL FOR THE APPELLEE OFFER DEROGATORY 
AND UNTRUE STATEMENTS TO THE TRIAL COURT AND THEREFORE 
MISLEAD THE TRIAL COURTS AND PREJUDICE THE TRIAL COURTS 
BASED ON THESE UNTRUES? 
Standard of Review: In Rule 4.1 {a}, Ut. Rules of Judicial Review, 
It clearly states that the makings of a false statement of a material fact. 
Chapter 13,Rule 3.3 a (1) Ut. Rules of Judicial Review, statesr A lawyer 
shall not knowingly m a k e a false statement of material fact o r law^to a 
tribunal and Rule 3.3 a(4hUt. Rules of Judicial Review states that 
offering of evidence that lawyer knows t o b e false or if thethe4awyer 
offered evidence and comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take 
reasonable steps remedial measures. 
H. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS 
REMOVAL OF THE PETITIONERS JOINT CUSTODY OF A MINOR 
CHILD, WITHOUT DUB PROCESS OF LAW AND DID THIS 
TERMINATION INFLUENCE LATER CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS? 
Standard of Review: "A mere findmg^that the parties a r e or are 
not "fit and proper persons to b e awarded the care, custody and control" 
4 
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L of the child cannot pass muster when t h e custody award is challenged 
P 
and an abuse of the trial court's discretion is urged on appeal". 
(Martinez v. Martinez. 728 P.2d 994 (Utah 1986) at page994.) 
Rule 5 (1) of URCP provides t h a t papers shall be served upon all 
parties and that without service due process was not proper process. 
m. DID THE TRIAL COURT"ABUSE ITS DISCRBTIOfMN 
BIFICATING PETITIONERS DIVORCE AND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW? 
Standard of Review According t e 7 ^ Am Jur 2d Sta tu te 133, 
states that a bifurcation of a-divereein mafrimonial cases is not 
suggested: and cites Ffnkelv, F inkd .12fVM4se 2d 936,466-N¥S2dr906. 
) Rule 5 {1) of URGP provides^ tha t papers shall be servedh upoft all 
parties and tbat without service d u e process-was not proper-preeess. 
IV. Dro€X>UNSEfcFORrTHE^PETntONERERRE^HIS 
REPRESENTATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER AND 
JUSTICE. 
Standard of review: In United States v. Tucker. 716 F.2d 576 
(9th Cir. 1983-)- paragraph 50, ineffective assistance of counsel: Mid 
counsel aet in a reasonably competent and: effective manner and, tf not, 
was his incompetence prejudicial to fee defense". "A lawyer shall 
provide competent representation to a client, chapter 1&, Rule-1.1 
U.R.J.A. . Competent representa&on-requircs the 
f 5 
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legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and preparation reasonably 
necessary for the representation. "A lawyer shall abide by a^hent ' s 
decisions concerning t h e objectives of representation" Ch . lS , Rule-1.2 
(a)U.R.J.A. 
V. DH> TRIAL COURT ABUSE ireDISCRETIONWITS 
REFUSAL THE HEAR EVIDENCE TO PROVIDE AN ANNULMENT OF 
THE MARRIAGE AN ABUSE OT THE^RIGHT* OF THE PETITIONER. 
Standard of Review: Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 102 states, 
"promotion of growth and development ef the law of evidenced© t h e e n d 
that the t r u t h may be aseertainedVand proceedings just ly determined". 
The federal ruies of evidence Article IVV Ruie~462, statesr^AH~releyant 
evidence is admissible". 
VI. DID TRIAL COUNSEL MISREPRESENT PETITIONER E* HIS 
UNTIMELINESS IN FORWARDING ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE 
OF DIVORCE CAUSING PETITIONER TO LOOSE CERTAET RIGHTS 
UNDER THE LAW. 
Standard of Reviewr Utah Code of Judicial Administiatiuii Rule 
1.4 (a), states a lawyer shafr4ceep^ a elient reasonable informed about 
die s tatus of a matter and prompdy comply with reasonable requests-for 
information. 
VH. THE TRIAL COURT^REFUSAL TOH5BT ASTOB-THE 
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER WAS CONTRARY 
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TO THE CONCEPTS OP JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION WHERE THE PROCESS OF JUSTICE HAD GONE AWRY 
BECAUSE OF INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL THAT MANIFEST 
INJUSTICE WILL RESULT OTHERWISE? 
Standard of Review: Incompetenee-or ineffective of counsel 
claims present a mixed question of faet and law^ Therefore, in a 
situation where a trial court ha s previously heard a motion^ based- on 
ineffective assistance of counsel, reviewing courts are free to m a k e an 
independent determinationrof t h e trial court 's conclusions. The factual 
findings of the trial cour t , however, shall no t b e set aside un less clearly 
erroneous. State v. Temphn 80^F.2nd^ 182.186 (Utah 199Hr State v. 
Crestani. 771 P.2nd 1085,K>891UtahApp. 1989)r State v. Goodman. 
763 P. 2nd 786, 787 (Utah >988)r State-v. Walker. 743 P.2nd 191, 193 
{Utah 1987). 
In Order to b r i n g s successful incompetence of counsel elaim. 
Appellant must show that prior eounsel 's performance was deficient in 
t h a t it fett below an objective standard of reasonableness^ a n d tha t the 
deficient performance prejudiced the-outeome. 
Further, t he appellant court must indulge in4he-strong 
presumption that counseFs^onduct falls within the wide range of 
reasonable professional assistance; t h a t -is-, the Appellant must 
overcome the presumption that under the circumstances, the 
challenged action might be eonsideredr sound strategy. 
In Order to demonstrate that trial counsel's deficient performance 
7 
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prejudiced the appellant, it mus t be shpwnrthat there is a reasonable 
probability that, but for counsels unprofessional errors, t he re su l t of 
the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. 
Templin. supra. 186; Sta tev . Garrett; 207 U.R.A. 45,46 ftJtahrApp. 
1993). / 
Vffl. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
GRANTING PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES? 
Standard of Review: 
/ 
Statement of the Rule: 4 - W 1 , 2 (akteh U.R. J.A. The eourt may 
l^ant the motion if the court finds that: (a>. t h e moving party lack* the 
financial resources to p a y for costs and feest (c>. the costs a n d fees are 
necessary for the proper prosecution of of the action. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS^ STATUTES & RULES 
REQUIRING INTERPRETATION 
Utah Rules of Givll Procedure 
Utah Rules of Givil Procedure 
Utah Rules of Givil Procedure 
Utah Rules of Judicial Admins^ 
Rule 3.3 (a>{4> UtahrRules^of Judicial Admins, 
Rule3.ata>{l> Utah Rule^of Judicial Admins. 
Rule4 . Itah Utah Rules of Judieial-Admins. 
Ch. 13, Rule 1.1 Utah Rutes-of Judieialr Admins. 
R u l e 5 (a) 
Rule 5 ei> 
Rule 3 7 
Rule 1.4 faf 
Pg:- 17 
pg, &,35;36v42 
m 48 
6 
4,34,40,41 
pg: 4,34-,40 
4,37,40,45 
5 
8 
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prejudiced the appellant, it must be shown that there is a reasonable 
probability that, bu t for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of 
the proceedings would have been different. A reasonable probability is a 
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. State v. 
Templin. supra, 186; State v. Garrett. 207 U.R.A.45,46 (Utah App. 
1993). 
Vm. DH> THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
GRANTING PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES? 
Standard of Review: 
Statement of the Rule: 4-011, 2 |a>,{e>. U.R. J.A. The <x>urt may 
grant the motion if the court finds that: (a), the moving party lacks the 
financial resources to pay for costs and fees; (c). the costs and fees are 
necessary for the proper prosecution of defense of the action. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES & RULES 
REQUIRING INTERPRETATION 
Rule 5 (a)(1) 
Rule 5 (a)(1) 
Rule 37 (f) 
Rule 1.1 
Rule 1.2(a) 
Rule 1.4 (a) 
Rule 3.3 (a)(1) 
Rule 3.3 (a) (4) 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
U.C.J.A. Chapter 13 
U.C.J.A. Chapter 13 
U.C.J.A. Chapter 13 
U.C.J.A. Chapter 13 
U.C.J.A. Chapter 13 
Pg. 
Pg-
Pg-
Pg-
Pg-
Pg. 
Pg 
Pg-
17 
5,35,36,42 
48 
5 
6 
6 
4,34,40 
4,34,40,41 
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Rule 4.1(a) 
Rule 4-911,2 (a), (c) 
Rule 102 
Rule 502 4, B, ill 
Article I Rule 102 
Statute 133 
U.C.J.A. Chapter 13 
U.C.J.A. Chapter 13 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Utah Rules of Evidence 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
75AMJUR2d 
Pg-
Pg-
Pg 
Pg 
Pg 
Pg 
4,37,40,45 
40,47 
6,36,44 
37 
6,44 
5,42 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1). Nature of the case This case involves a custody 
dispute between parties who were in a relationship since 1993. The 
Appellee was at the time a foreign exchange student from Russia and 
the Republic of Georgia. Over the insueing months the relationship 
developed marriage was brought up. The Appellant brought up the age 
difference between the parties and was told by the Appellee that in her 
country she would be getting married right now. That the Appellee's 
grandfather was twice the age of her grandmother and that Appellee's 
mother was ten years older than her father. 
In December of 1993 Appellant went to Russia to meet Appellee's 
family and ask about marriage. A few days prior to leaving for Russia 
the Appellant meet in passing, Roy Jesperson who at that time was the 
Appellee's sponsor as an exchange student. Mr. Jesperson asked the 
Appellant "how do you know she is not marring you to get into the 
country." Upon arriving in Russia the Appellant asked the Appellee 
about what Mr. Jesperson had said and the Appellee laughed and said 
9 
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/ 
Ch. 13, Rule 1.2 
Rule 4-911,2 (a), 
Rule 102 
Rule 502 4, B, 111 
Statute 133 
(a) 
(c) 
Article VT Rule 102 
Utah Rules of Judicial Admins. / 
Utah Rules of Judicial Admins. 
Utah Rules of Evidence / 
Utah Rules of Evidence / 
7 5 A M J U R 2 d / 
/ 
Federal Rulea of Evidence 
Pg-
Pg-
Pg 
Pg 
Pg 
Vt 
6 
40,47 
6,3&,44 
37 
&,42 
6,44 
/ 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1). Nature of the case This ease involves^ st custody 
/ dispute between parties whchwerein-a relationship since 1903. The 
Appellee was at the time at foreign^ exchange student from Russia^ and 
the Republic of Georgia. Over th^insucingmonths the relationship 
* developed^ marriage was brought up; The Appellant brought up-the age 
difference between the parties^ andr was told by^  the Appellee that in-her 
country she would be getting married right now. That the Appellee's 
grandfather was twice the age of her grandmother and that Appellee's 
mother was ten years older than-her father. 
In December of/1993^ Appellant went to Russia to meet Appellee's 
family and ask about marriage. A fewdays prior to leaving for Russia 
the Appellant meet in passing, Roy Jespersenwho at that time was^the 
Appellee's sponsor as an exchange student. Mr. Jespersen asked^the 
AppeUant"how do you^know^she ianet marring you to get int&the 
country." Upon arrivingir* Russia the Appellant asked the Appellee 
about what Mr. Jesperson hadr said and the Appellee laughed^ an& said 
• / 
0 I 9-
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it was a joke between them. 
TheAppeHant andrAppcllcc exchanged wedding rings in Russia 
and in March of 1994 returned together to the United States. Oft June 
9th, 1994 Appellant and Appellee were married in Salt Lake City Utah. 
In October 1994 the Appellant had life threatening surgery and 
required the couple to move to California which they did after ihe birth 
of their daughter in January 1995. In December of 1994 the Appellee's 
mother Tanja came to stay theeouple for three months and-also made 
the move to California. Appellant required a seeond surgery which-was 
had at the end of January 1995. 
The couple lived in California near the ApjreUant^m©ther-#om 
Jan. 1995 to Sept. 1995. In June of 1995^ Appellee no lon^r nursing 
fee child, wanted to 6& something and got a Job4n California. 
Att monies whicbrthe Appellee made was her money to^use and 
spends how she liked. The Appellant was responsible for-aHfamily 
expenses. 
hi Sept. of 1995 the couple rcturncdrto Salt Lake City and stayed 
wtthr a mutuaL Mend until they found an apartment, h r Oct. 1995 the 
family movedrinto a small apartoaent irrSalt Lake City. The family 
consisted of Appellant and Appellee their daughter and the Appellee's 
mother. In late Nov. 199&tbeAppcHant4eft to go to California for work 
and rcturncd^ust before Christmas 1995. 
The day before the Appellant's return foSalt Lake Cttyrthe 
Appellee's^ mother movedrout^ statingr"she was having a nervous 
10-
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breakdown earing for our hh month old child aHrthe timer" Tamriko-was 
away most of the timey with friends and left the-ehild frvthc care of her 
mother. Upon the Appellants returnrthe^Appellee's schedule did not 
change and the Appellant fremr that day forward was the primary^eare 
grver fer-eur child. 
The relationship^betweeHrthe Appellant and the Appellee was not 
good. The Appellant found a journaTbelonging to the Appellee and^ead 
it for the purpose of understanding why his relationships with-the 
Appellee was so bad. The Journal revealed that the Appellee was having 
extra marital affairs with men she was acquainting herself-with, and 
dated baek to^April of ±994. 
The Appellant confronted the Appellee on this discovery of journal 
entries and the Appellee charged^ the Appellant and rjegar^hitting^ and 
pulling Appellant's hair. The Appellant had to-jump oufthe second floor 
window of the apartment te- escape fee attack. The Appellee thanrwent 
to stay with her mother. 
Shortly thereafter, Appellant asked-the Appellee to work things 
out, Appellee wanted some time alone. The Appellant and there child 
went t& stay with family in California. Appellant and the^hild^toved 
out of the apartment and the Appellee moved back in. The last time the 
Appellant and the chfld resided with the Appellee was middle February 
199€-and to that point Appellant was-responsible for ati-expenses. 
While in California the Appellant read^ a Journal ofthe Appellee's 
which stated; 
11 
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The Appellee writes "I ain't in love with Walter. As always in 
my life, right now I have to make a lot of choices- and again 
and again and again Of course probably, the most clever 
thing for me to do would be to goback to the USA with 
Walter . For there this- way, I can get education I want to get, 
work, hobbies andnsoon. AH this will be much easier to^et 
being next te-Walter, for 1 know hewill help^me as much-as he 
ean." (ree.236-256) 
In J u n e of 199fr the Appellant confronted the Appellee on the 
discovery while in California. Shortly thereafter, the Appellee 
telephoned the Appellant and saidr"if you^do^ot help mewith^ny 
immigration I will fight you for custody of our daughter." 
tor July 1996 the Appellant returned to Salt Lake City with their 
daughter. After additional physical and verbal attacks by the Appellee, 
toward the Appellant, a Protective Order was filed against the Appellee. 
Custody of their daughter wa&^ven4o the Appellant a& well as child 
support order to be determined at tetek this^was^a^-eedto-by-the 
Appellee and granted by the Third District Court,Ut., case* 960906856 
SA, filed Nov; 5th 1996^attachmcnt # 1 ). 
Appellee writes "I am with Baf^iy; all day... t want to just runr away 
toN.¥r(ree 236-256). 
Over the next 9 months the Appellee made no attempts^to^ see their 
child. When the Appellant and the child were out and happened-tensee 
the Appellee, the Appellant would stop so that the child couldsee4ier 
12 
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mother. There were a number of times when the Appellant would take 
the child to the AppeHee^s pkteeof work so that the chlldrcould see her 
mother. 
September through November of 1997 theAppelleecalledto-see 
her daughter st couple of times a month and^eita couple ^ f those 
occasions Appellant assisted^Appellee with transportation. 
Gnroneof the visits our daughter came home and asked Appellant 
why mommy says that daddy 4s a bad guy. After hearing^this Appellant 
told Appellee that she should not: be sayings this to our daughter. 
Shortly thereafter our child came home after at visit withr the Appellee's 
mother, the Appellee was alse there, and the child asked the Appellant 
why does nana say that daddy is a bad gay. Again the Appellant 
telephoned the Appellee this time warned Appellee not to do it again. 
In late November of f997 after a visit with the Appellee theehild 
came home saying that the Appellee had told her not to eat daddy's pe-
pe. The child at this time is ordy 34 months old. The AppeHanthas 
been the only stable figure in thechUds life te-this point. IN THE 
GHILDS^BEST INTEREST AFTER-THES£ THREE INCroENTS-THE 
APPELLANT TOLD THE APPELLEE SHE COULD NOT SEE OUR CHILD 
ALONE. 
At this point, Appellant telephoned^ his attorney Robert Macri told 
him of the situation and to have supervised visitation arranged. This 
was done by the Appellant on December 02, 1996 after whfeh-time 
Appellant and the child left te-Cahforniarlbr the Christmas holiday.^Mr. 
ia 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Macrl never followed through with his use of the affidavit and 
supervised visitation was never requested. 
Appellant reeeivedra called in California by Mr. Macri and was 
informed-that-Appellant needed tfr return^ as soon as possible. 
Prior t&this, it was agreedrt^by the Appellant aneVthe Appellee 
that the ehUeVwould be withrthe Appellant for the December Ghrishnas 
and witrr the Appellee in-January for the Orthodox Christmas. 
When Appellant returnedr from Christmas^ vacation with the-ehild 
Appellant wa& told that I had t o ^ ^ e the minor ehild overtfr the Appellee 
which Appellant couleVnetrdOv Appellant wanted first to-ge-before the 
Judge. 
On January 9th, 1997 Appellant wrote an-Affidavi^for the eeurts 
prior t€h the seheduledrJanuary K£, 1997 hearing date. The Appellant's 
affidavitr of January 9th-1997 nor-the Letter to the c o u r t s ^ December 
02, 1996^appear on the-reeord? Yet were provided by theAppellant to 
Appellants^ attorney Robert Macri. 
The Affidavit of the Appellee dated December 22, t996^s a 
document which Appellant was-never-made aware of, and the first time 
Appellant saw this document wa^in September of 2002. This-doeument 
(Affidavit of Appellee 12-22-9&, ree. 29^a7>i& so^full of untruths and 
depicts Appellant as arbaoVguy. 
That Appellant understand* better why the trial court and later 
the custody evaluator has^aetedrfhe way-they have toward Appellant. 
And justifies^ the slant-which the custody evaluator bases his-later 
14 
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decisions and conclusions and on. 
2) Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower ^ }ourt 
On October 23, 1996^etiti©ner SlesHfor annulment ©fdivoree 
(ree. 1 -3}. Appellant is granted^ustody of title minor child. 
December 22,190? Appelleefiles-affidavit (rec. 29-37)-,- and obtains 
temporary restraining. 
J a » 12,1998 hearing before Judge rwasikf, Appellant and Appellee 
ordered joint custody of child. January 12, 199& hearing Appellee's 
attorney Suzanne MareMus^ spoke before Judge Iwasiki and made4ier 
remarks and two points come to mind which were completely and totally 
untrue; 
1} the Appellee was not allowed to speak to her daughter en-her 
birthday. This is not true.! 
2} That the Appellant was in possession of Appellee's personal 
belongtogs and refusedr to give them to Appellee. This was^ not true! 
Appellant had tried for months^ prfoF to this asking the Appellee tocome 
and piek-up^ these belongings, and reimburse-Appellant the-$450 
shipping expense from Ganforniai The Appellant was told by^his 
attorney Mr. Macri to retain-the journals for the future proceedings. 
The Appellant sees now how his^tetions^ in- court before Honorable Judge 
Iwasakt January 12, 1997^were dfsrespecaau-of the courtsv^nd 
apofo^zes for emotional this outburst. It was spirited by-emotion and a 
reaction^ to-the-untrues-verbalized to the courts Ms. Marelius. 
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Macri never followed through with his use of the affidavit and 
supervised visitation was never requested. 
Appellant received a called in California by Mr. Macri and was 
informed that Appellant needed to return as soon as possible. 
Prior to this, it was agreed: to by the Appellant and the Appellee 
that the child would be with the Appellant for the December Christmas 
and with the Appellee irt January for the Orthodox Christmas. 
When Appellant returned from Christmas vacation with-the child 
Appellant was told that I had to give the minor child over to the Appellee 
which Appellant could not do% Appellant wanted first to go before the 
Judge. 
On January 9th, 1997 Appellant wrote an Affidavit for the courts 
prior to the scheduled January t2 , 1997 hearing date. The Appellant's 
affidavit of January 9th^ 1907 nor t he Letter to^the courts of December 
02, 1996 appear on the record? Yet were provided by the Appellant to 
Appellants attorney Robert Macri. 
The Affidavit of the AppelteedatedrDeeember 22, 19964s a 
document which Appellant was never made aware of, and the first time 
Appellant saw this document was in September of 2002. This document 
(Affidavit of Appellee 12-22-96, rec. 29-37>is so full of untruths and 
depicts Appellant as a bad guy. 
That Appellant understands better why the trial court andr later 
the custody evaluator has acted-the way they have toward Appellant. 
And justifies the slant whiehr the custody evaluator basea his4ater 
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> 
decisions and conclusions and on. 
2) Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Oourt 
On October 23, 199€rPetitioner fUes for annulment of drvorce 
(rec. 1 -3). Appellant is granted custody of the minor child. 
December 22,1997 AppeHeeffles affidavit {rec. 29-37), and obtains 
temporary restraining. 
J a n 12,1998 hearing before Judge Iwasikt, Appellant and Appellee 
ordered joint eustody of child. January 12, 1998 hearing Appellee's 
attorney Suzanne Maretius spoke before Judge Iwasiki and made her 
remarks and two points come t&mind which were completely an&^otally 
untrue; 
1) the Appellee was not allowed to speak to her daughter e n her 
t 
birthday. ^ Fhis is not b?ue.! 
2) That the Appellant was in possession vf Appellee's personal 
belonf^ngs and refused to ^ e them tfr Appellee. This was net true! 
Appellant had tried for months-prior to this asking the Appellee toeome 
and piek-up these belongings, ^ndTeiinburse Appellant ^ fae-ftl 50 
stappingjexpense fromCahfornia. The Appellant was told-by his 
attorney Mr. Maori to retain the journals fer^hefuture proceedings. 
The Appellant sees nowhow^his actions in court before Honorable Judge 
Iwasaki January 12, 1997 were disrespectful of the courts, ftnd 
apologies for emotional this outburst. It was spirited by emotion and a 
leacLioii to the untrues veibalized to the cuuits Ms. Mare^ius. 
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Appellants attorney Mr. Macri knew these statements were untrue and 
yet said nothing. Mr. Maori never informed the Appellant «f the affidavit 
of the Bee. 22, 1997. Mr. Maerf informed theAppellant mat the judge 
placed him to contempt and: told Appellant he could be put in jail. ^Fhis 
seared the Appellant and nothing more was questioned by-the 
Appellant, until this appeal. 
The Appellant has never t a or in front of the child any madeany 
disparaging remarks about the ehilds mother. The child: has asked 
"why" about the problems between her mom and dad. Appellant said 
"mommy did not tell daddy the truth, and that it is only between 
mommy and daddy". This is the only possible remark which could be 
construed as disparaging, but it is the truth and the only way Appellant 
could answer his ehilds question. 
This custody arrangement ended on October 26th 2Q€KMn a 
hearing before Commissioner Bradford. 
It should be noted that the Appellant's Attorney Mr. Robert Macri 
died in March of 2000, he was Appellants only attorney. 
MOTION OCTOBER 26, 2000 
Hearing October 26, 2000, Appellant before commissioner 
Bradford asked the court was not knowing why he was there tha^day, 
(transcript on motion 10-26-00, pg 1, lines 8-22, attachment # 2 ). 
Ms. Marelius "I know Mr. Horton's problem is he probably hasn't 
received a copy of my motion because the mailing address he gave^the 
court and me is apparently not a good address and I got one pleading 
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back at least." (see attachment # 2, pg 1, line 25, pg 2, linesi*6). 
There was no bad address! The Appellant recited into thereeordrhis 
address, and court records wiHr reflect that this is the same address 
already in the court record. The same address that Appellant had 
received the letter from the court notifying him of the hearing Appellant 
was at this day. There was no had address! 
Ms. Marelius made false statements disparaging the Appellant. 
Appellant recognizes 17-1$ false statements made by the Ms. Marehus, 
about the Appellant (attachment* 2 , Pg 4, lines 15-25 & Pg. 5, lines 1-
25 & Pg. 6, lines 1-10 & Pg. 7 lines 15-49). 
What transpired on this day was Appellee being granting ^f^sole 
custody and a bifurcation of the fault divorce. Both objeetedrfo a^the 
time of hearing by Appellant. Appellant brought up to the courts 4hat 
the Appellant was seeking to have the marriage annulled {h-anserip^ on 
motion, attachment #2 ,10-26-00, pg. 12, lines 5-6). 
Appellant did not have the benefit of counsel, and was looking. 
The Appellant did not have the benefit of a copy of the motion and 
was thereby was blind sided by the Appellee's Attorney, in violation of 
Rule5(a}U.R.C.P.. 
Let it also be noted that these motion or pleadings are not found in 
the courts record. 
Over the ensuing months the child spent so much time with-the 
Appellee's mother that the childs teacher asked the Appellant who in 
your family speaks another language. This continued and continues to 
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this day that the child is a good deal of the time in surrogate eare. That 
the Appellant has never, never been called and asked to eare of his 
child. 
For the next 18 months a lot of activity took place in this-ease. 
Appellant was unaware of most of it. Mr. Macrf did not inibrm4he 
Appellant of the proceedings. Between April thru August 4099, 
Appellant was in California and was unaware of-court filings. 
Appellant and Appellee had themselves modified the visitation 
schedule and the child was in California half of the time with Appellant. 
Appellee knew of course that Appellant was in California and yet filings 
continued as Appellee's attorney Ms. Marelius tried to file motions^nd 
orders. Why did Appellee not inform Ms. Marelius of Appellants current 
status. 
DIVORCE STIPULATION/ SETTLEMENT JUNE 29, 2001 
The Appellant engaged the services of attorney Martin Tanner by 
the time of pretrial which Mr. Tanner attended and also represented the 
Appellant at trial June 29th, 2001, before the Honorable Judge Iwasiki. 
Mr. Tanner telephoned the Appellant on or about June 12th 2001 
and said he had just gotten the evaluation that he had read-the 
evaluation and said that the Appellee and the Appellant were even 
except that Appellant was unable to have a home visit with^the 
evahiator and that the Appellee therefore appeared more stable. The 
Appellant told Mr. Tanner he wanted ta go to^  trial on custody. The 
Appellant asked about the custody evaluates and Mr. Tanner saidrhe 
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would have the evaluator at the trial. 
June 28th, 2001 Mr. Tanner telephoned Appellant and said he 
received a fax from Ms. Marelius a finding and fact and conclusions of 
law and a decree of divorce. Appellant told Mr. Tanner he waygoing to 
trial. That Appellant had the evidence for trial. Where Appellant lived 
,Where child friends were in the neighborhood. Mr. Tanner said ok, and 
that they should meet the next morning at 8:30 am, June 29th, 2001. 
Mr. Tanner did not show up to his office until 8:55 am and said 
they would go over it on the walking to the court house. Upon arriving 
at the court house that Appellants custody evaluator was not present, 
Mr. Tanner responded he could not be there. 
Appellant was taken aback. 
Mr. Tanner lead Appellant into a conference room andrwas 
followed by Appellant's brother a member of the LDS churehrwith a 
temple recommend and the Appellant's mother. 
Mr. Tanner went over with the Appellant the, findings andfact 
and conclusion of law. Appellant, Appellant's brother, Appellant's 
Mother and Mr. Tanner for the next hour worked out stipulations to^aot 
have a trial. 
Mr. Tanner told the Appellant the importance of the Custody 
Evaluation and that the judge decides 99% of the time with the 
Evaluators decision. 
Mr Tanner told Appellant he would lose in a trial! 
That Appellant would owe $5000 to $6000 in attorneys fees for 
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Appellee. This fact untrue, the finding and fact, state; eaeh party pays 
own attorneys fees. 
The following stipulations were worked out 
1) Mr. Tanner would guarantee that Appellant wouM^et 
"FIRST RIGHT GF REFUSAL". Thatrif childs mulhei euuld not 
be with her thea the child could come home. Appellant 
proposed sceneries, example: "when the child i& home and 
her mother has to work past the ehilds bedtime woutdohild 
be able to stay home?" and Mr. Tanner responded that-fhe 
Appellee would pick up the child after school the next day. 
2} Appellant was told that he would have the child 1/3-ef-the 
year under the proposed visitation schedule. 
3) That the child support arrears would be computed against 
child support owed to Appellant by Appellee. 
4) That marital debt was to be dropped 
5) The Appellant was concerned aboutrfuture child support *hat 
some months Appellant made little money and others more 
money. That $800 would be a baseband fluctuate with 
Appellants income. Mr. Tanner lead Appellant to believe 
that child support was for taking care of health4nsurance 
and care of the child. 
Appellant strongly objected to marital debts and that while ^he 
Appellant and the Appellee were living under the same roof Appellant 
paid all expenses. The birthing of the child was paid for by Baby^your 
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Baby. Appellant therefore challenges the marital debt. Mr Tanner ^old 
Appellant this section would be dropped. 
6} The Appellant was told by Mr. Tanner that the Judge would 
not hear evidence and grant an annulment because "he 
would not make a bastard out of the child". Appellant had a 
problem with irreconcilable difference and believed tt would 
be adultly for the Appellee had already admitted te that {see 
attachment #3). 
The Appellant, Mr. Tanner D. Troy Horton and Katharine Horton 
were in the conference room for about arr hour several times Mn Tanner 
got up to discuss Ms. Marelius stipulations adjustments a number of 
times. 
In the court room before Judge Iwasiki Mr. Tanner addressed-the 
court and refers to the findings and fact and decree of divorce that 4hey 
"wiH constitute the settlement agreement with the parties with a couple 
additions" ree. 362 Pg. 1 lines 21-22). 
Mr. Tanner begins with "disparaging remarks" (ree. 362, Pg. 1 tine 
24). 
Note: This stipulation already covered in (ree. 274-284 
Facts and Findings pg 7, #12) 
Mr. Tanner and continues with eurd side visitation, free. 274^484 
Pg. 2 line 1), 
Note: This stipulation already exists in writing (ree.274-284 
pg. 8 #12) 
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Mr. Tanner continues, "OTHER ITEMS"-- (rec. 362, Pg. 2 , Hne9). 
Mr. Tanner is then cut off mid-sentence by Ms. Marelius. 
Ms. Marelius "And I want to add a couple of items". Ms. Marelius 
reads into the record "address and telephone number" (ree. 362, , Pg. 2 , 
line 14). 
Note: This is already eovered (ree.285-294 ,deeree of 
divorce pg. 4 ,K). 
Ms. Marelius reads into the record "petitioner is restrained from 
interfering with the child including sehool enrollment, health matters, 
child care and other custodial issues and that just comes right out of 
the temporary orders" 
Note: These were never discussed and no temporary orders 
were ever discussed in the pretrial conference room. 
Appellant is unaware of what this is. 
Ms. Marelius continues "restraint of derogatory, demeaning, 
negative comments"(rec. 362, Pg. 2 , lines 21-22). 
Note: This is already eovered (rec.274-284, facts and 
finding pg. 7 #12) 
Ms. Marelius continues "we've also discussed telephone contact" 
(rec. 362, Pg. 2 , line 23). 
Noter This is already eovered (ree.285-294, deereeof 
divorce pg. 3 ,L) 
Appellants contention is that the stipulations wbicfr were read 
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into the record already existed in writing, within the facts and findings 
rec.274-284 and the deciee of^divoice jtec.285-294. It makes the 
Appellant wonder if it were net just for show. 
The court returns to^Mr. Tanner, Mr Tanner is asked^if there i s 
anything further Mr. Tanner answers "NO YOUR HONOR". (rec.362,-Pg. 
3 lines 16-17). 
Mr. Tanners "other items" (ree. 362, Pg. 2 , line 9}. never got^ead 
into the record and therefore Ms. Marelius did not include them in the 
final draft of the finds and fact and the-decree. 
The Judge asks the Appellant" do you under the term* and 
conditions of this stipulated settlement? free. 362 Pg. 4 lines 5-8). 
Appellant answers "I think I understand them and I'll read through 
them when they're written up and I think everything has been agreed 
upon", (rec. #360, Pg. 4 lines 14-16). Appellant says Til read through 
them when they're written up". Nothing that we agreed t& in the ^uter 
conference room before trial was read into the record. That is why the 
Appellant answered "when they are wr i t t en^" . 
The Appellant relied on his attorney to get these facts interne 
findings and the decree. Those items which he negotiated in-the 
pretrial conference room. 
Is this a stipulated settlement when there are no stipulations? 
The stipulations which was read into the record already existed in-the 
proposed facts and finding and the decree. Therefore, how^ean tt4se a 
stipulated settlement? 
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Appellant told his daughter that she is going to still live with her 
mom. But now if she wanted to come home instead of going to-aasa'-s or 
other babysitters she could. That if mommy is working or can not be 
with you and you want to come home, you can! 
When the child told her mother what she understood about being 
able to come home, the Appellee called the Appellant. The Appellee said 
to the Appellant that this is not the ease. 
The Appellant then telephoned Mr. Tanner and left a message for 
him to call (July 3rd, 2001), no return call. Appellant again telephoned 
Mr. TannerfJuly 5th,2001K no return eaH. Appellant again telephoned 
Mr. Tanner (July 6th,20Ol), again no return call. Appellant again 
telephoned Mr. Tanner (July 9th, 2001), and again no return call. 
Appellant sent fax to Mr. Tanner (July 12th, 2001), and again no 
response. Appellant finally received a letter from Mr. Tanner {dated 
Aug. 03, 2001, (see attachment #4} & days after the facts and findings 
and the decree were already signed by Judge Iwasiki. 
Appellant due te- Mr. Tanner's untimeliness in responding to 
Appellants calls, lost certain rights, to challenge findings^ and fact ^nd 
the Decree. This untimeliness is a clear violation of responsibilitie& of 
the attorney client relationship. It should be noted here that the 
stipulations were mailed by Ms. Marelius on July 6th, 2001. Mr. Tanner 
mailed a note to Appellant on August 03, 2001 (see Attaehment#4H Mr 
Tanner's untimeliness made it impossible for Appellant to challenge 4he 
judgments under Rule 50 of U.R.CP. 
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Mr. Tanner said he guaranteed {at trial June 29th,2001) that^he 
would have in writing that Appellant would have first right of refusat or 
first right to tend and for the minor child to come home to Appellant 
when the mother could not b e wrtfr her. 
Only one of the stipulations which were a^-eed to in the pretrial 
conference were made apart of the Facts and Findings and Decree. The 
one on marital debt. Marital Debts was put back in by Commissioner 
Bradfords ruling on Appellants 60 (b) motion and in amending it tea- 60 
a motion clerical errors. 
If this were correct, that it was an issue of clerical error, would not 
the Appellee have made her own 60 (a) motion for this $2000. 
And the most important stipulation First Right of Refusal was 
negated by Appellee's attorney Ms. Marelius when she inserted a 
paragraph of her own device, (ree. 285-294, paragraph 2, 
subparagraph (a)). Appellant contends this paragraph 2a was inserted 
by Appellee's attorney Ms. Marelius after the question arose between 
the Appellant and the Appellee over the first right of refusal issue. 
After trial June 29th,2001 Mr. Tanner walks Appellant over te^bis 
office where Mr. Tanner drafts u p an affidavit for Appellant to sign, 
stating that this way he could get into the record the evidence of 
marriage fraud (ree. 236-256). 
Mr. Tanner withdrew a& counsel on October 04, 2001. 
HEARING ON MOTIONS DECEMBER 20, 2001 
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Appellant hired attorney Steven Kuhnhausen to file a 
(U.R.C.P. 60 b) motion to set aside. Appellant discussed the case with 
Mr. Kuhnhausen told him of the missing stipulations. Mr. Kuhnhausen 
said he could not go for all of the stipulations right now, but would-file 
on the First Right of Refusal and the Child Support. Why Mr. 
Kuhnhausen would bring ur> all the missing stipulations Appellant does 
not know. 
Mr. Kuhnhausen said that he had looked at the file and- that 
Appellant was a "bad guy" that Appellant had kept her stuff. Appellant 
told Mr. Kuhnhausen that this was not true. Appellant recalled back to 
the first time, in front of Judge Iwasik4 January of 1998 when Ms. 
Marelius made this statement to Judge Iwasiki. 
Mr. Kuhnhausen was given the necessary documents to flte^and 
was told that Appellant's mother Katharine Horton {attachment # 5 ) 
and brother Troy Horton (attachment # 6} whe were alse in the pretrial 
conference room and that they would provide written statements as to 
what was promised by Mr. Tanner to pretrial conference. 
Appellant brought these written statements with himr to-the 
hearing on Dee. 20, 2001. 
Mr. Kuhnhausen told the Appellant that he could not show them 
to the court because Mr. Kuhnhausen did not have them 3 days before 
the hearing. 
Mr. Ktrhnhauserr was aware of th is evidence and air no-time did 
Mr. Kuhnhausen inform the Appellant that he needed them before the 
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trial. This evidence was so germane to the case that the 60 b motion 
was denied. These written statements were the backbone of the case for 
the 60b motion to set aside. 
In addition under Rule 37 of U.R.C.P. these written statements 
could and should have been admitted. Appellants contention is that by 
Mr. Kuhnhausen in not offering these written statements to the courts 
did not sufficiently represented the Appellant. 
Mr. Kuhnhausen made a mistake in not supplying these written 
statements to the court. 
In transcript (rec.362, pg. 4 lines 14-16) Appellant when asked by 
Judge Iwasiki if he understands and agrees responds "I'll read through 
them when they are written up and I think everything has been agreed 
to". This was said because what was told to Appellant, by Mr. Tanner, 
was not mentioned and Appellant was therefore looking to the drafted 
facts and findings and decree, "when they are written up". Mr. 
Kuhnhausen makes this fact available to the court in (rec. 363 pg.3 
lines 24-25). 
It was not brought up by Mr. Kuhnhausen in the hearing that Mr. 
Tanner at trial in addressing the court as to the pretrial conference that 
Mr. Tanner continues with "OTHER ITEMS-" and at this point is cut off 
mid sentence by Appellee's attorney Ms.Marelius (rec. 362 , pg.2 line 9). 
When the court returns to Mr. Tanner he claims he has nothing more. 
The court goes on to questions the Appellant on not having filed a 
Rule 59 motion "and he now wants to fix Ibis with a 60 h motion" and 
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that "he didn't do all the things to make this right" (hearing on motions 
12-20-01, rec. 363 pg.28 lines 6-9). Again, Mr. Tanner did not mail to 
the Appellant until Aug 03, 2001 notice that he had received the 
paperwork from Ms. Marelius and therefore was unable to meet the 10 
day rule, and rule 59 motion. The court recognizes that there is 
problems with this and leaves it to the Appellant to file a Malpractice 
against Mr. Tanner(rec. 363 hearing on morions 12-20-01, pg.29 fines 
19-24) and again suggests that Appellant should have "objected the 
first time around"(rec. 363 hearing on motions 12-20-01, pg.29 lines 20-
23). This is an abuse of discretion on the part of the court 
It was however, clear to the courts that there were problems The 
court set it aside under a 60 (a) motion. That there was no mention as 
to para. 2 (a) in either the proposed facts and finding or the decree of 
June 28, 2001. The court thereby ordered that new facts and finding 
and conclusions of law and decree be drafted that mirror the tape. 
This order thereby completely negates the efforts of parties and 
counsel in the, 1 hour long pretrial conference to work out stipulations, 
which were recognized by the courts in Judge Iwasiki remarks of 
"herculean efforts", (ree. 362 pg.l line 12-13). 
It should be noted that again Ms. Marelius made false and 
derogatory statements to the court about the Appellant. Ms. Marelius 
asserts that the Appellant is "basically homeless" (rec. 363 pg. 16 line 
14), that Appellant "lived in his car half of the time" (ree. 363 pg. 17 lines 
2-3). Again and again Ms. Marelius makes these untrue statements to 
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the court. These and other statements are completely untrue and 
displays a lack of candor to the eourts by Ms. Marelius and is against 
theU.R.J.A. chapter 13, 3.3(a)(1). 
Appellant placed full faith and reliance in all of his attorneys Mr. 
Macri, Mr Tanner, Mr. Kuhnhausen that there representation could be 
relied upon 100%. Appellant spent good money for the guidance and to 
protect his interests. Appellant is aware now that mistakes by counsel 
were made and in the interest of Justice, Appellant asks to Appeal this 
matter before the courts. 
3: Statement of Facts 
October 23, 1996 Appellant filed an Complaint for Annulment of 
divorce, which included 
a. a temporary and permanent award of custody to Appellant. 
b. child support 
November 05,1996 Appellant obtained protective order to against 
Appellee. 
December 22, 1998 Appellee files affidavit and obtains restraining 
order against Appellant. This restraining order was issued based on the 
affidavit of Appellee. Attorney for the Mr. Maeri never made Appellant 
aware of this document. Appellant now aware of this document 
recognizes the absence of truth. 
January 12, 1998 Joint custody is ordered by the courts. A 
custody evaluation is ordered. 
29 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
October 26, 2000 Court grants sole custody of child to Appellee. 
In this hearing before Commissioner Bradford attorney for the Appellee 
Ms. Marelius makes 1& false statements and swayed the courts to 
award custody of the child to the Appellee. 
Court also bifurcates the divorce. This is objected to Appellant. 
Appellant is seeking an annulment. Ms. Marelius states her client 
wants to get remarried! That she can not because there is no 
bifurcation or divorce. Court granted bifurcation and reserves for Mai 
on issue of annulment (see attachment #2, pg. 15 lines 23-24). 
To date, the Appellee has yet to marry Appellee lives with her 
boyfriend and Appellants daughter. The eonduet of which is not legal in 
the State of Utah. And should have been ruled as such by the custody 
evaluator as to moral character. 
This proceeding took place without the Appellant having been 
served with pleading or motions prior to the hearing and therefore was 
without due process, and Appellant did not have the benefit of counsel. 
June 29th, 2001, at trial Mr. Tanner was representing Appellant 
and Ms. Marelius was representing Appellee. 
In the court room before Judge Iwasiki Mr. Tanner addressed the 
court and refers to the findings and fact and decree of divoree that they 
"will constitute the settlement agreement with the parties with a couple 
additions'* (ree.362, June 29, 2001, Pg. 1 lines 21-22). 
Mr. Tanner begins with "disparaging remarks" (rec. 362, Pg. 1 line 
24). 
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. Note: This stipulation already covered in (rec. 301-331, Facts 
and Findings pg 7, #12) 
Mr. Tanner and continues with curd side visitation, (rec. 362, 
Pg. 2 line 1), 
Note: This stipulation already exists in writing (rec.301 -331, 
findings and finding pg. 8 ,#12) 
Mr. Tanner continues, "OTHER ITEMS"- (rec. 362, Pg. 2 , line 9). 
Mr. Tanner is then cut off mid-sentence by Ms. Marelius. 
Ms. Marelius "And I want to add a couple of items". 
Ms. Marelius reads into the record "address and telephone 
number contact" (rec. 362, Pg. 2 , line 14). 
Note: This is already covered (rec. 301 -331, decree of 
| divorce pg. 4 , K ). 
Ms. Marelius reads into the record "petitioner is restrained from 
interfering with the child including school enrollment, health matters, 
child care and other custodial issues and that just comes right out of 
the temporary orders" 
Note: These were never discussed and no temporary orders 
were ever discussed in the pretrial conference room. 
Appellant is unaware of what this is. 
Ms. Marelius continues "restraint of derogatory, demeaning, 
negative comments"(rec. 362, Pg. 2 , lines 21-22). 
Note: This is already covered (ree.301-331, facts and 
finding pg. 7 #12) 
> 31 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Ms. Marelius continues "we've also discussed telephone contact" 
(rec. 362, Pg. 2 , line 23). 
Note: This is already covered (rec. 301-331, decree of 
divorce pg. 3, L ) 
Appellants contention. The stipulations which were read int&the 
record already existed in writing, within the facts and findings and the 
decree of divorce. So, where is the stipulated settlement? 
The court returns to Mr. Tanner, Mr Tanner is asked if there is 
anything further Mr. Tanner answers "NO YOUR HONOR", (rec.362, Pg. 
3, lines 16-17). 
Mr. Tanners "other items" never get read into the record and 
therefore Ms. Marelius did not include them in the final draft of the 
finds and fact and decree. 
Mr. Tanner did not sign off on the finding and fact or the decree. 
Mr. Tanner failed follow through with seeing that the findings and 
fact and decree represented that which wa& agreed to in predial 
conference. 
Mr. Tanner failed to respond many phones calls and a fax sent by 
Appellant. 
Mr. Tanner failed te-communicate, with the Appellant until a letter 
dated August 03, 2001(see attaehment#4). This was 6 days after the 
findings and fact and the decree had already been signed by Judge 
Iwasiki. Appellant was thereby denied his rights to file a rule 50 motion. 
HEARINOON MOTIONS DEC. 2€h 2001. 
32^  
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Appellant files rule 60 b motion. Appellant represented by Mr 
Kuhnhausen and Appellee represented by Ms. Marelius. 
The court recognized problems with the proceeding of June 29th, 
2001 and ordered Appellants 60 h motion t&be amended to a 60 a 
motion. Ms. Marelius is ordered to rewrite fee findings and fact andrthe 
decree to mirror the the tape of rec. 362. 
The court recognized potential malpractice of attorney by Mr. 
Tanner and under 60 b motion should ease should have been set aside. 
Court ruled against Appellant on failure to take first steps and file 
a Rule 59 motion. This option was never available to Appellant due to 
the untimeliness of Mr. Tanner's contact with Appellants days after the 
facts and findings and decree had already been signed. 
SUMMARY OF AJEGUMBNTS 
I. DID COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT OFFER 
DEROGATORY AND UNTRUE STATEMENTS TO THE TRIAL COURT 
AND THEREFORE MISLEAD THE TRIAL COURTS AND PREJUDICE 
THE TRIAL COURTS BASED ON THESE UNTRUES. 
A lawyer shall not knowingly make a false statement of material 
fact or law to a tribunal. Ms. Marelius has again and again has made 
statements to the tribunal that are out and out untruth. It is the 
Appellants belief that these untrue statements^ have prejudiced the 
33 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
trial court against the Appellant. These acts are a clear violation of 
Chapter 13,Rule 3.3 a (1) Ut. Rules of Judicial Review 
In October of 2001 after hiring Mr. Kuhnhausen, Mr. Kuhnhausen 
after reading Appellants file told the Appellant that "you are a bad guy, 
that you kept "Appellee's stuff." This is was not true and if is in the 
court record than it is put there by Ms. MareMus. 
In a hearing before Judge Iwasiki January 12,199& made a 
untrue statements including that the Appellee was not allowed to speak 
with her daughter on her birthday, this was also untrue. 
Ms. Marelius in a hearing before Commissioner Bradford 
(December 26, 2000) made to the trial court 17-18 absolutely false 
statements. 
» 
Ms. Marelius before^Commissioner Bradford (December 20; 2001) 
made 2 more absolutely false statements to the trial court, all to 
disparage the Appellant, all untrue. All contrary to Rule 3.3 a (4>, Ut. 
Rules of Judicial Review 
In the interest of taruth and Justice, the findings and fact and the 
decree should be set aside. 
n. DID THE TRIAL COURT&ABUSE I^TS DISCRETION IN ITS 
REMOVAL OF PETITIONERS JOINT CUSTODY OF A MINOR CHILD, 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESSOR LAW AND DID THIS TERMINATION 
INFLUENCE LATER CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS. 
The Appellant was in court October 26, 2000 without benefit of 
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counsel and without any pleading as to the proceeding that day. No 
procedural due process existed this day for the Appellant. This in itself 
is in violation of Rule 5 (1 > of URCP, which provides for procedural: due 
process to protect the rights of the parties. 
The findings merely recite that Appellee is a fit and proper person 
to awarded custody. There were no current findings as to- what would 
be in the best interest of the child. The only current facts were false 
statements made by the Appellee's attorney. There was a two year old 
custody evaluation which the courts deemed insufficient at the time and 
ordered a follow-up evaluation. There had been no evidentiary hearing 
on the issue of custody to allow the court to hear and weigh evidence 
and judge the credibility of witnesses or an ability to confront the 
statements made by Ms. Marelius, nor is there a signed stipulation 
signed by the parties as to what those facts are. That custody was not 
tried by the commissioner upon anymore than hearsay facts presented 
by Ms. Marelius on that day that. "A mere finding that the parties are 
or are not "fit and proper persons to be awarded the care, custody and 
control" of the child cannot pass muster when the custody award is 
challenged and an abuse of the trial court's discretion is urgedron 
appeal". (Martinez v. Martinez. 728 P.2d 994 (Utah 1986) at page 994.) 
Appellant contends that, had custody not changed, that upon the 
newly ordered custody evaluation, the evaluator would have after 3 
years of joint custody, left custody the same joint custody. 
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ffl. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
BIFICATING PETITIONERS DIVORCE AND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW? 
The Appellant was in court October 26, 2000 without benefit of 
counsel and without any pleading a s to the proceeding that day. No 
procedural due process existed this day for the Appellant on Ge t 26, 
2000, a d e a r violation of Rule-&fl} of URCP. 
There was no due process on th i s day for the Appellant. And-that 
these proceedings should not have manifested any decisions by the 
Court. 
IV, DID COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER ERR IN HIS 
REPRESENTATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER AND 
JUSTICE. 
The Appellant arrived a t court o n J u n e 29> 2001 expecting t ogo to 
trial. Upon his arrival the one witness he was expecting t o have was^the 
custody evaluator. It t u rns out that Mr. Tanner failed tofnvite^the 
custody evaluator. 
In pretrial conference Mr. Tanner attorney for the AppeHant^eat 
down the Appellant into working out stipulations that would at least 
give the Appellant more time with h is child. Mr. Tanner negotiated 1) 
'First Right of Refusal', 2} child suppor t would be based onAppeHants 
income and a base income of $800 per mo.,3>That Appellant would have 
custody of 1 / 3 of the year, 4} that marital debt was to b e dropped 5) 
36 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that back child support for Appellee was to be offset by back child 
support owed to Appellant. 
Mr. Tanner failed to read into the record the agreed stipulations. 
Mr. Tanner failed to see that these stipulations were put into the 
drafted finding and fact and decree. 
Mr. Tanner failed to timely forward on to Appellant the finding and 
facts and the decree drafted by the Appellee's attorney. 
V. DH> THE TRIAL COURT'S ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS 
REFUSAL TO HEAR EVIDENCE TO PROVIDE THE PETITIONER WITH 
THE OPTION OF AN ANNULMENT IN HIS MARRIAGE AND THEREBY 
ABUSE THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER. 
This point of issue res ts squarely on Rule 102 of Utah Rule* of 
Evidence. Appellant on the issue of seeking an annulment of-his 
marriage was told by Commissioner Bradford, on Oct 26th, 2000, "with 
that later on it may be changed to a decree of annulment if you prove 
your ease" (see attachment #2, pg. 15 lines 23-24). At t r i a l J u n e 2 6 t h 
before Judge Iwasiki Appellant is- told Judge will not allow evidence on 
this matter (see attachment # 3 ). 
Rule 102 of U.R.E., states, "These rules shall be construed to 
secure fairness in administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense 
and delay, and promotion of growth and development of the law of 
evidence to the end that the t ruth may be ascertained and proceedings 
justly determined''. 
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Under Rule 502 U.R.E. (4>,(B>. tfii} Petitioner was denied Iris right to 
provide evidence. 
In a letter to Appellant Mr. Tanner writes "Judge Iwasiki was not 
about ta revisit his decision to en lei a divorce decree and made that 
clear several times" (see attachment # 3 ). 
VI. DID COUNSBIrMISREPRBSBN^FBTmONERrB^HIg 
UNTIMELINESS IN FORWARDING ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE 
OF DIV^^CEiCAUSINGiPJETITIONER.TO LOOSBjCERTABt 
UNDER THE LAW? 
Utah Code of Judicial Adminisfration Rule 1.4 (a), states a lawyer 
shall keep a client reasonable informed about the status of a matter and 
promptiy comply with reasonable requests for information. 
Mr. Tanner not only did not return phone calls and a fax to the 
Appellant between the 3rd of July, 2001 and the 16th of July 2001 but 
did not communicate with the Appellant until a letter dated 
August 03, 2001 (see attachment #4 ). This was 6 days after the Judge 
had already signed off on the findings and fact and the decree. 3 days 
in the mail and you are^at the 10 days to file a rule 59 motton^under 
U.R.C.P.. This lack of promptness by Appellant's attorney is 
misrepresentation and therefore qualifies under 60 (b). 
The Appellant should not be held hostage by ineffectiveness^ of 
counsel and the 60 (b) motion should have been granted and set aside. 
RIGHTS 
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VH. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE 
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER WAS CONTRARY 
TO CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION BECAUSE THE PROCESS OF JUSTICE HAD GONE AWRY 
BECAUSE OF INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL SO THAT MANIFEST 
INJUSTICE WAS THE RESULT. 
Commissioner held against the Appellant in seeking the 60 (b) 
motion hearing of December 20th, 2001 "Appellant didn't do an 
objection. He didn't do all of the things you're suppose to do to set it 
right. He's asking now to fix it by 60 (b), I am denying the 6a {b) 
motion"(rec. 363, pg. 28, lines 6-9). 
Commissioner Bradford "be it malpractice issue or not" (rec. 363, 
pg. 29 line 19), therefore doubt existed and again should have been set 
aside under attorney neglect or malpractice. 
The Appellant had telephoned Mr. Tanner and left a message for 
him to call (July 3rd, 2001), no return call. Appellant again telephoned 
Mr. Tanner(July 5th,2001), no return call. Appellant again telephoned 
Mr. Tanner (July 6th,20Ol), again no return call. Appellant again 
telephoned Mr. Tanner (July 9th, 2001), and again no return call. 
Appellant sent fax to Mr. Tanner (July 12th, 2001), and again no 
response. Appellant finally received a letter from Mr. Tanner (dated 
Aug. 03, 2001, see attachment # 4 ) 6 days after the facts and findings 
and the decree were signed by Judge Iwasiki. 
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Vm. DID THE TRIAL ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT GRANTING 
PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES? 
Statement of the Rule: 4-911, 2 (a),(e). U.R.J .A. The court may 
grant the motion if the court finds that: (a), the moving party lacks the 
financial resources to pay for costs and fees; (c). the costs and fees are 
necessary for the proper prosecution of defense of the action. Under 
this rule and the need of the Appellant should have been granted 
attorneys fees. The court told Appellee's attorney Ms. Marelius "I'm 
going to set you back to exactly what the video says"(rec. 363 pg 30 lines 
3-4). 
That without this action Ms. Marelius paragraph 2a would have 
stood. It was removed and the motion 60 (b) action was necessary for it 
to be removed. The trial court therefore should have awarded attorneys 
fees. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DID COUNSEL FOR THE RESPONDENT OFFER 
DEROGATORY AND UNTRUE STATEMENTS TO THE TRIAL COURT 
AND THEREFORE MISLEAD THE TRIAL COURTS AND PREJUDICE 
THE TRIAL COURTS BASED ON THESE UNTRUES. 
In Rule 4.1 (a), Ut. Rules of Judicial Review, It clearly states that 
the making of a false statement of a material fact. Chapter 13,Rule 3.3 
a (1) Ut. Rules of Judicial Review, states: A lawyer shall not knowingly 
make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal and Rule 3.3 
a (4) 
Ms. Marelius has again and again has made statements that are 
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out and out untruths . The Appellant believes that these untrue 
statements have prejudiced the trial court against the Appellant. 
In October of 2001 after hiring Mr. Kuhnhausen, Mr. Kuhnhausen 
after reading Appellants file told the Appellant that "you are a bad guy, 
that you kept "Appellee's stuff." This is was not true and if is in the 
court record than it is put there by Ms. Marelius. 
In a hearing before Judge Iwasiki January 12,1998 made a 
untrue statements including that the Appellee was not allowed to speak 
with her daughter on her birthday, this was also untrue. 
Ms. Marelius in a hearing before Commissioner Bradford 
(December 26, 2000) made to the trial court 17-18 absolutely false 
statements. 
| Ms. Marelius before Commissioner Bradford (December 20, 2001) 
made 2 more absolutely false statements to the trial court, all to 
disparage the Appellant, all untrue. All contrary to Rule 3.3 a (4), Ut. 
Rules of Judicial Review 
In the interest of t ruth and justice, the findings and fact and the 
decree should not be used as a vehicle by which to rewrite history. That 
these unt ru ths prejudiced the custody evaluator and therefore 
produced an inaccurate evaluation. 
H. DID THE TRIAL COURTS ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS 
REMOVAL OF PETITIONERS JOINT CUSTODY OF A MINOR CHILD, 
WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND DID THIS TERMINATION 
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INFLUENCE LATER CUSTODY PROCEEDINGS. 
There was no due process for the Appellant on this day and that 
any action by the court was an abuse of the Appellants rights. 
Rule 5 (1) of URCP provides that papers shall be served upon all ; 
parties and that without service due process was not proper process. 
That had custody remained constant and therefore reflected 
period of 3 years of joint custody, without problems, the custody would 
have been different. And in the absence of the un t ru ths made apart of 
the record by Appellee, and based on the joint custody guidelines 
provided by this state, (Utah code 30-3-10), custody would have been 
given to the Appellant. 
m . DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
BIFICATING PETITIONERS DWORCE AND WITHOUT DUE PROCESS 
OF LAW? 
There was no due process for the Appellant on this day and that 
any action by the court was an abuse of the Appellants rights. 
Rule 5 (1} of URCP provides that papers shall be served upon all 
parties and that without service due process was not proper process. 
According to 75 Am J u r 2d Statute 133, states that a bifurcation of 
a divorce in matrimonial cases is not suggested and cites Finkel v. 
Finkel.120 Misc 2d 936.466 NYS2d 906. 
IV. DID COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER ERR IN HIS 
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REPRESENTATION OF THE RIGHTS OF THE PETITIONER AND 
JUSTICE. 
Counsel for the Appellant failed to provide the custody evaluator to 
be present at the time of trial. 
Counsel for the Appellant failed to read into the record those 
stipulation which were negotiated in pretrial conference, thereby 
denying Appellant those stipulations. 
Counsel for the Appellant failed to return phone calls on half a 
dozen occasions. 
Counsel for the Appellant failed to attempt to notify Appellant of 
the proposed findings and fact and the decree until 6 days after the 
findings and fact and the decree had already been signed by the Judge. 
| This untimeliness caused Appellant to lose rights under the law in 
regards to the rule 59 motion, a fact which was later held against the 
Appellant in the lower court. 
In United States v. Tucker. 716 F.2d 576 (9th Cir.1983) paragraph 
50, ineffective assistance of counsel: "did counsel act in a reasonably 
competent and effective manner and, if not, was his incompetence 
prejudicial to the defense". 
That the Appellant was prejudiced by his attorney's 
representation. That the untimeliness by which the attorney 
represented the Appellant, causing the Appellant to lose the right to file 
a Rule 59 motion. Appellant was later denied a rule 60 (b) motion based 
on this lack of diligence by the lower court. 
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V. IS THE TRIAL COURT'S ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN ITS 
REFUSAL TO HEAR EVIDENCE TO PROVIDE AN PETITIONER WITH 
AN ANNULMENT OF THE MARRIAGE AND ABUSE THE RIGHTS OF 
THE PETITIONER. 
It was stipulated by the court on October 26, 2000 that addressing 
the annulment of the divorce would be reserved for trial. 
At trial through Mr. Tanner, Appellant is told that the Judge will 
not listen to evidence on the issue of annulment and make a bastard 
out of the child. Utah law provides (Utah Code Ann.sec. 30-1-17.2) that 
if an annulment is obtained the child is still considered legitimate in the 
eyes of the court. 
Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 102 states, "promotion of growth and 
development of the law of evidence to the end that the t ruth may be 
ascertained and proceedings justly determined". The federal rules of 
evidence Article IV. Rule 402, states: "All relevant evidence is 
admissible". 
In a hearing before commissioner Bradford October 26, 2001 the 
right to seek an annulment was reserved by the court for trial, (see 
attachment #2). At trial Appellant was told by his Attorney that the 
Judge will not revisit his decision the divorce (see attachment # 3) 
This is an abuse of the rights of the petitioner by the courts! And, 
the judgment should be set aside. 
VI. DID COUNSEL MISREPRESENT PETITIONER IN HIS 
UNTIMELINESS IN FORWARDING ON THE SUPPLEMENTAL DECREE 
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OF DIVORCE CAUSING PETITIONER TO LOOSE CERTAIN RIGHTS 
UNDER THE LAW. 
Utah Code of Judicial Administration Rule 1.4 (a), states a lawyer 
shall keep a client reasonable informed about the status of a matter and 
promptly comply with reasonable requests for information. 
Mr. Tanner did not attempt to notify the Appellant until 6 days 
after the facts and findings and decree had already been signed. 
Thereby, removing the rights of the Appellant to file a rule 59 motion. 
This apparent lack of action on the part of the Appellant was held 
against the Appellant by the courts in hearing before commissioner 
Bradford, where she sites;The court goes on to questions the Appellant 
on not having filed a Rule 59 motion "and he now wants to fix this with a 
60 b motion" and that "he didn't do all the things to make this right" 
(hearing on motions 12-20-01, rec. 363 pg.28 lines 6-9). Again, Mr. 
Tanner did not mail to the Appellant until Aug 03, 2001 notice that he 
had received the paperwork from Ms. Marelius and therefore was 
unable to meet the 10 day rule, and rule 59 motion. The court 
recognizes that there is problems with this and leaves it to the Appellant 
to file a Malpractice against Mr. Tanner (rec. 363 , pg.29 lines 19-24) 
and again suggests that Appellant should have "objected the first time 
around"(rec. 363 hearing on motions 12-20-01, pg.29 lines 20-23). This 
single failure on the part of Appellants counsel resulted in a prejudice 
toward the Appellant by the court and therefore the judgment should be 
set aside. 
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Vn. THE TRIAL COURT'S REFUSAL TO SET ASIDE THE 
JUDGMENT ENTERED AGAINST THE PETITIONER WAS CONTRARY 
TO THE CONCEPTS OF JUSTICE AND EQUITY AND AN ABUSE OF 
DISCRETION WHERE THE PROCESS OF JUSTICE HAD GONE AWRY 
BECAUSE OF INCOMPETENCE OF COUNSEL THAT MANIFEST IN 
JUSTICE WILL RESULT OTHERWISE? 
Utah law recognizes that "under exigent or exceptional 
circumstances which appear to have resulted in an injustice, the court 
may be justified in granting a new trial" because of the negligence of 
counsel. Jennings v. Stoker, supra at page 913. 
In recognizing this rule, the Jennings Court cited the earlier case 
of Maltby v. Cox Construction Co.. 598 P2nd 36 (Utah 1979). In 
concurring opinion which was joined by two other justices, Chief Justice 
Crocket stated as follows: 
The purpose of all court proceedings is, of course to do justice. If 
the processes have so clearly gone awry that an injustice has 
resulted, the court in charge of the trial, or the Court on review, 
should rectify such an unfortunate occurrence, whether the 
proceedings is criminal or civil. 
In so saying, I am aware that it is generally said that mistake, 
error of judgment or negligence of counsel in presenting or 
defending a case is not sufficient cause of vacating a judgment 
and granting a new trial. 
However, consistent with the principle stated above, it is held that, 
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under exigent circumstance, incompetence or negligence of 
counsel which appears to have resulted in an injustice, will justify the 
granting of a new trial, (at page 341, 342) 
Ms. Marelius lack of candor to the tribunal. 
Mr. Tanner's lack of follow through with respect to: 1) reading into 
the record the stipulations negotiated and agreed to by the parties, in 
the one hour long pretrial conference, and the 2) lack of response to 
repeated attempts of contact by the Appellant, and the 3) untimeliness 
in which Mr. Tanner contacted Appellant about the findings and fact 
and decree should be sufficient cause to remand for further proceeding 
and that the rule 60 b motion should have been granted. 
Mr. Kuhnhausen's failure to provide the Appellant to present 
evidence supporting his Rule 60 b motion is neglect or a mistake and 
should have been presentted by counsel under Rule 37 of U.R.C.P. This 
therefore adds to the validity of Appellants claim and justifies the 
granting of the judgment to be set aside. 
Vm. DID THE TRIAL COURT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN NOT 
GRANTING PETITIONER ATTORNEYS FEES? 
Statement of the Rule: 4-911,2 (a),(c). U.R.J .A. The court may 
grant the motion if the court finds that: (a), the moving party lacks the 
financial resources to pay for costs and fees; (c). the costs and fees are 
necessary for the proper prosecution of defense of the action. 
The rule 60 (b) motion was necessary to have removed the 
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paragraph 2 (a) (rec.285-294) which was devised by Ms. Marellus to take 
away those rights which were guaranteed to Appellant for visitation. 
The court agreed with Appellant and Ms. Marellus was ordered to 
redraft the findings and fact and the decree. Attorneys fees should 
therefore should have been granted. 
QQNCmSIQW 
The trial court has apparently abused the rights of the Appellant 
on a number of occasions. First, on October 26, 2000 when orders were 
made against the Appellant, without the Appellant having had the 
benefit counsel or procedural due process. Second, when the trial 
apparently denied the Appellant the right to present evidence. Third 
when the trial court refused to grant Appellants 60 (b) motion even with 
the question of apparent attorney malpractice. 
At trial the Appellant was most poorly represented by counsel. Mr. 
Tanners failure to read Into the record the agreed upon stipulations, his 
total lack of response to Appellants attempts to reach him, and his 
gross incompetence with respect to providing the Appellant the finding 
and fact and decree days after they were already singed off by the judge. 
At hearing on Appellants 60 (b) motion, Mr. Kuhnhausen's failure 
to allow Appellant to provide evidence germane to Appellants case. 
These results are a shameful Indictment of a system gone awry that the 
interests of justice and the best interests of the child have been lost. 
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This court should set aside the Facts and Findings and 
Conclusions of Law and the Decree Divorce and allow this matter to be 
fairly decided, and the Appellant a trial on the merits. 
Dated this 0$th day of December 2002. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITXEDJBY 
Walter John Horton 
Pro-Se 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing Brief of the 
appellant has been sent to Suzanne MareUus the counsel for the 
Appellee in this matter, by US mail to the below address: 
Littlefield andJ?eterson 
c /o Suzanne Marelius 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
WalterJ . Horton 
> 
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^Petitioner's Name
 r y/ 
% £n i $m fo ^  lib 
Address (may be emitted for privacy) 
City State, ZIP 
Telephone (may be omitted) By. 
FN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
FUS) DISTRICT COURT 
Third Judical District 
NOV 0 5 1995 
96.fi LAKE COUNTY 
~.K 5 1 , , ^ , 
TOT 
A'Q-tsL&i Mv/?7v^, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
T/ini/?•/</] KHis'T) 3 /' /f ST7' v'iL i 
Respondent. 
PROTECTIVE ORDER 
civil "NO. f/> eli&ttfLQfr— 
Judge LlYlUH-Jd 
This matter came for hearing on fP /^X/ / / y before the undersigned. The 
following parties were in attendance: •?.
 A 
\ ^ Petitioner D Petitioner's attorney MA-L^Sf / ^VX-A^kX _ 
fV Respondent o Respondent's attorney 
"^Cju 
- • • > 
m 
,The Court having reviewed Petitioner's Verified Petition for Protective Order and: 
having received argument and evidence, 
having accepted the stipulation of the parties 
having entered the default of the Respondent for failure to appear 
and it appearing that domestic violence or abuse has occurred, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 
(The Judge or Commissioner shall initial 
each section that is included in this Order.) 
1. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to 
^commit abuse or domestic violence against Petitioner. 
^ -. 
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2. The Respondent is restrained from attempting, committing, or threatening to 
commit abuse or domestic violence against the following minor children and members of 
Petitioner's family or household: 
The Respondent is prohibited from directly or indirectly contacting, harassing, 
telephoning, or otherwise communicating with the Petitioner. 
4. The Respondent shall be removed and excluded, and shall stay away, from 
Petitioner's residence, and its premises, located at: 
and Respondent is prohibited from terminating or interfering with the utility services to the 
residence. 
5. The Respondent is ordered to stay away from the school, place of employment, 
and/or other places, and their premises, frequented by Petitioner, the minor children and 
the designated household and family members. These places are identified by the 
following addresses: 
6. The Court having found that Respondent's use or possession of a weapon may pose 
a serious threat of harm to Petitioner, the Respondent is prohibited from purchasing, using, 
or possessing a firearm and/or the following weapon(s): 
7. The Petitioner is awarded possession of the following residence, automobile and/or 
other essential personal effects: 
This award is subject to orders concerning the listed property in future domestic 
proceedings. 
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8, An officer from the following law enforcement agency: 
shall accompany Petitioner to ensure that Petitioner 
safely regains possession of the awarded property. 
9. An officer from the same law enforcement agency shall facilitate Respondent's 
removal of Respondent's essential personal belongings from the parties' residence. The 
law enforcement officer shall contact Petitioner to make these arrangements. Respondent 
may not contact the Petitioner or enter the residence to obtain any items. 
10. The Respondent is placed under the supervision of the Department of Corrections 
for the purposes of electronic monitoring. Within 24 hours of the execution of this Order, 
the Department of Corrections shall place an electronic monitoring device on Respondent 
and shall install monitoring equipment on the premises of Petitioner and in the residence 
of Respondent. Respondent is ordered to pay to the Department of Corrections the costs 
of the electronic monitoring required by this Order. The Department of Corrections shall 
have access to Petitioner's residence to install the appropriate monitoring equipment. 
RESPONDENT'S VIOLATION OF PROVISIONS "1" TBROUGH "10" MAY BE A CLASS 
A MISDEMEANOR. 
Petitioner is granted the following temporary relief (provisions "a" through "l") which will 
(expire/be reviewed by the court) days from the date of this order: 
TheJPetitioner is granted custody of the foUo wing, minor children: 7N a. titi r i  r t  t  f t  f li  i , i r  
X b. Visitation shall be as follows: \Q ^-LAL^lUtJ^y^C.A^ ,/^^flijJJll:^ 
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c. The Respondent is restrained from using drugs and/or alcohol prior to or during 
visitation, 
•~fWA ?V d. The Respondent is restrained from removing the parties' minor child/ren from the 
^stateofUtah. 
r*^ tX e. The Respondent is ordered to pay child support to the Petitioner in the amount of 
$ j^iyJUU^j Ctl 1/W(^3ureuant to the Utah Uniform Child Support Guidelines. 
f. The Respondent is ordered to participate in mandatory income withholding pursuant 
to Utah Code Annotated § 62A-11, Parts 4 and 5. 
g. The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren1 s day care 
expenses. 
h. The Respondent is ordered to pay one-half of the minor child/ren's medical 
expenses including premiums, deductibles and co-payments. 
_ _ _ i. The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner spousal support in the amount of 
$ . 
j . The Respondent is ordered to pay Petitioner's medical expenses, suffered as a result 
of the abuse in the amount of $ . 
k. The Respondent is ordered to pay the minor child/ren1 s medical expenses, suffered 
as a result of the abuse in the amount of $ _ . 
1. Other 
Violation of provisions "a" through "1" may subject Respondent to contempt proceedings. 
11. The Division of Child and Family Services is ordered to conduct an investigation 
into the allegation of child abuse. 
12. Other: 
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i " A _ j / _ ^ j ^ w enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the protected locations shall have 
authority to compel Respondent's compliance with this Order, including the authority to forcibly 
evict and restrain Respondent from the protected areas. Information to assist with identification 
of the Respondent is attached to the Appendix to this Order. 
I w 14. Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that 
gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1976, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, the District of 
Columbia, tribal lands, and United States Territories. 
^ ^ _J^1 . 15. Three years after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the 
remaining provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, the 
Petitioner should provide the court with a current address, which address will not be made 
available to Respondent. 
DATED: '' /) ' ,0A £^T 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
Recommended by: 
L L U L / i*>u\% 
District Court Commissioner^ Date 
By this signature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts service, 
of thisProtective Order arx^aives the right to be personally served. 
Respondent 
i^ ~ Serve Respondent at: 
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TWA—v_43# i^v enforcement agencies with jurisdiction over the protected locations shall have 
authority to compel Respondent's compliance with this Order, including the authority to forcibly 
evict and restrain Respondent from the protected areas. Information to assist with identification 
of the Respondent is attached to the Appendix to this Order. 
14. Respondent was afforded both notice and opportunity to be heard in the hearing that 
gave rise to this order. Pursuant to the Violence Against Women Act of 1994, P.L. 103-322, 108 
Stat. 1976, 18 U.S.C.A. 2265, this order is valid in all the United States, the District of 
Columbia, tribal lands, and United States Territories. 
~7fvU ^J^L 15. Three years after the date of this order, a hearing may be held to dismiss the 
remaining provisions of the order. Within 30 days prior to the end of the three-year period, the 
Petitioner should provide the court with a current address, which address will not be made 
available to Respondent. 
DATED: f /) '
 (QA <f& 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT J U D G ^ 3 
Recommended by: 
District Court C o m m i s s i o n e r ^ D a t e 
By this signature, Respondent approves the form, and accepts service, 
of thisj^rotective Order anjj^aives the right to be personally served. 
^^Cl.if^ 
Respondent 
} ^ ~ ) n Serve Respondent at: 
£ 
-ZLC OT~ &HIC7. 
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Salt Lake County Sheriff's Office 
Court Services Division 
RETURN OF SERVICE 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE } s.s. SHERIFFS OFFICE 
1) S E R V E D /3 /WAAJJ^CV \A JfK /^^UAJ^a^}^^JU 
D Witness D Garnishee (3rd Party D Defendant D Plaintiff) * D Other 
& Original 
D Amended 
G Duplicate 
ffl Defendant D Plaintiff 
2) D A T E RECEIVED l(7-7A % 3) DATE S E R V E D U.-Z.-tt' 
4) PROCESS D Summons D Complaint D Criminal summons D Amended summons D Amended complaint 
D Verified complaint D Order to show D Sup-order Q Small claims—order & affidavit D Order D Garnishment 
D Notice D Civil subpoena D Affidavit D Motion D Petition D Notice*of nearfog Q Information D Testimony 
D Garnishee Order • Criminal Subpoena D Notice of Seizure y^rf j)A JL. 
D Decree D Certificate D Citation D Exhibits D Declaration (B Other \-^^\\ ^J^*-^ 
5) TYPE OF SERVICE B Personal D Left at residence with 
discretion there residing Q Posted "(see item 9) D Company or Corp. 
D Other 
. at usual place of abode with a person of suitable age and 
(name & nnej 
6) L O C A T I O N O F SERVICE 
D Other 
Wilt HOO^ - ft^- ^jufe^-Xj) 
. O Home D Business 
(Specify, jail, hospital, etc.) 
7) (B l further certify that at the time of service, o n c o p y served. I endorsed the date, s igned my name and official title thereto. 
8) D l tendered a fee of $ . & took receipt which is hereto attached. 
9) D Mailed a copy of notice, postage prepaid, to said defendant on (date)
 ; 
at given address, (see item 6). by clerk 
AARON D. KENNARD, Sheriff of Salt Lake County, State of Utah 
DOCKET # Jt) ^  IMbb^y 
r»oX*ce^*- J „v, A Z ^ I certify that the forgoing is true and correct and that this certificate 
>SHERIFFS FEES:
 i s e x e c u t e d o n (date) J r H M > 
Service $ 
'Mileage $
 A,/ * By UAftM* Total $ 2? 
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SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH - OCTOBER 26, 2000 
COMMISSIONER SUSAN BRADFORD PRESIDING 
P R O C E E D I N G S 
THE COURT: Tamrika K. matter, and my apologies, 
ma'am, I would slaughter your name and it would be embarrassing 
for me and you would probably be insulted so I won't go there. 
Go ahead, counsel. 
MR. HORTON: I have a question before the Court if I 
may get an understanding of that before she continues? 
THE COURT: What's the question, sir? 
MR. HORTON: The law in motion, 
THE COURT: Well, what does that mean? 
MR. HORTON: Is that what we're doing here today? 
THE COURT: What this is is parties may file for 
temporary relief while the case is pending and the law and 
motion is where people make motions and then there's a decision 
made on that while you're getting your case brought to trial 
and so this is sort of an interim step while you're waiting for 
your case to be completed. I hope that suffices. It's sort of 
an abbreviated — 
MR. HORTON: - motions are something new since our 
last meeting within your chambers? 
THE COURT: No. Most of this has always been in the 
law. It's just something that they brought today. 
MS. MARELIUS: I know Mr. Horton's problem is he 
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1 probably hasn't received a copy of my motion because the 
2 mailing address he gave the Court and me, is apparently not a 
3 good address and so I got one pleading back at least. I think 
4 I've sent him three things. I got one thing back that said no 
5 such address, so I'm still a little uncertain as to that 
6 mailing address. So he may be confused about what's before the 
7 Court today. I know that he has consulted with counsel because 
8 an attorney spoke with me and said Mr. Horton, you know, talked 
9 to me about this OSC and when it was but now apparently he's 
10 not retained that attorney. So, I was a little concerned about 
11 notice but I think it's his duty to keep the Court informed and 
12 I would ask again that Mr. Horton give us a valid mailing 
13 address. 
14 THE COURT: That is correct. And before we go on, Mr, 
15 Horton, for the record, what is your address? 
16 MR. HORTON: It is 450 East Slade Place, 84102. 
17 THE COURT: And it is your affirmative duty, sir, if 
18 you change addresses, phone numbers, you must let the Court 
19 know and counsel know that you have done that. 
20 MR. HORTON: I understand. 
21 THE COURT: It is presumed that that's a good 
22 address. 
23 MR. HORTON: My bills arrive there. I receive mail 
24 there. 
25 THE COURT: Go ahead, counsel. 
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MS. MARELIUS: I'm glad to have that. Your Honor, we 
were before you September 11 in this case for a Pretrial. Mr. 
Horton was present by himself at that time and the Court 
entered some orders, gave him 10 days to file a Financial 
Declaration, which he has not done; five days to return 
journals to my client, which he didn't do; three weeks to 
return property to the grandmother, which he didn't do; and 
ordered the parties to.cooperate with an updated custody eval. 
I was hoping after that, those admonishments, those 
deadlines by the Court, we may have an attorney on board or 
some effort to settle this and none of that happened. In fact, 
Mr. Horton went to California for 30 days so he just left and 
we've continue to have problems in this case. 
The other piece of new information is I contacted the 
custody evaluator for an update. Apparently DCFS has one part-
time social worker doing these. He had eight cases ahead of 
this. He said, if you're lucky, I'll start March, April, 
Spring and based on that I just could not imagine my client 
going that long or these parties without a temporary order in 
place. We've never had that. We had a protective order that 
long expired and a visitation order, so given the level of_ 
problems we're having, we just must have a temporary order. 
I also ask this Court to certify it for trial. I 
think you probably did. You suggested an update but I jut 
think it's intolerable for these folks to wait that long and I 
3 
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1 would like to just go ahead to Judge Iwasaki at this point, I 
2 mean, after this. He may send up back to the updated, you '**ff 
3 know, along those lines, but I think we have enough to complete 
4 the case. 
5 So with that background, what we are requesting today 
6 is that petitioner - I'm sorry - respondent be awarded sole 
7 custody of this five and a half year old child. Astonishing as 
8 it is, we had one and half year old marriage and a four year 
9 separation. This case has been pending all that time. They've 
10 had a three day/four day exchange visitation order which worked 
11 pretty well most of the time for a child under five, not in 
12 school. As time has gone on, the child has been more and more 
13 with my client as Mr. Horton has been more and more in 
14 California and I would submit that there's no question that she 
15 is primary caretakerA\)That was certainly the finding of the 
16 J custody evaluator that was dated April, x98 and these events of 
17 I more time with my client have been certainly subsequent to 
18 J that. 
19 It's also very telling, parties have been under a 
20 Court order for four years. What do they do in those four 
21 years? My client has maintained a stable residence,% 
22 employment. She's had a couple jobs. She's always had 
23 earnings, income. She's been at the University of Utah 
24 maintaining a 3.8 average. She's just doing very well in the 
25 categories of having a goal in life and working towards it. 
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She's also entered into a new relationship and is now living 
with her fiancee'. She would love to get married. She can't 
because we don't have a bifurcation or a divorce here. 
So, in those four years, my client I think has 
accomplished a lot. She's also been the sole financial support 
of this child.'l) She has done all of the caretaking,^fall of the 
health appointments,^ all of the arrangements for that£7 She's 
enrolled the child in schoolv- As soon as that happened, we 
started to have a higher degree of interference. Mr. Horton 
thought she should skip kindergarten, be in first grade, tried 
to withdraw her a couple of times. My client finally convinced 
the school not to do that3 He's since changed her schedule at 
kindergarten, making her stay another hour without consulting 
my client and we don't think that's appropriate. 
The big problem now by contrast is Mr. Horton - and 
I'm not even sure he's going to be arguing for custody today, 
but he has done nothing in four years. He had no job and no 
home four years ago. "He still has no job and no home.l^I 
consider him homeless \\ During the visits he seems to take the 
child in his car and drive between restaurants and coffee 
shops. When he has overnights, it's always at a home of a 
relative.v Most recently it's been at his brother's home and 
that could change. He has a father in the area too and so he 
does not have a home for the child and the child has no room or 
particular attachment to these relatives which is a very big 
5 
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1 contrast to my client.1 He's never provided any support, never 
2 shown us that he can do that. \7 V^ 
3 His profession is apparently one of an inventor and a 
4 remodeler. His longest point of residing someplace was in a 
5 home he was remodeling that my client had real concerns about. 
6 It was a construction site with nails and equipment all around 
7 and she was very uncomfortable with the child visiting there. 
8 And at this point, I don't think Mr. Horton has met any basic 
9 standard of being a presentable custodial parent. So we seek 
10 sole custody. 
11 I also believe we need to have a standard right of 
12 visitation here. This year we've had ten months this year. I 
13 think it's fair to say he spent half the year in California and 
14 so I think the visitation order should be no more than standard. 
15 but my client would also accommodate his availability and she's 
16 shown a very great willingness to do that with this three and 
17 four days thing. We've not been to Court a thousand times on 
18 conflicts and contempt so I think we can trust in her to do 
19 that if there is a long absence. 
20 Visitation I think has to be very limited here. I 
21 mean, not limited but defined so it is at a location that my 
22 client knows. The brother's home is fine. If it's going to be 
23 at a home or location other than that, I think she needs to 
24 know. If it's going to overnight, she should check it out in 
25 advance because we've had, you know, as I've indicated 
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historical concerns on the kind of dwelling he thinks is 
appropriate. 
Child support has never been paid. I would like to 
file with the Court a copy of a worksheet based on my client. 
She filed a Financial Declaration. She earns $1,416 a month. 
I am assessing minimum wage for Mr. Horton to support amount of 
$141 and I think it's important that we begin that process of 
support order and see what happens. 
I think the standard provisions, they have shared 
child care costs. It's not been a problem but that should be 
ordered. Sharing of out of pocket health insurance premiums 
and payments should be ordered. Restraint from petitioner 
interfering with school enrollment and the relationship between 
the child and mother must be ordered. We've had some very 
disturbing episodes. The child is telling the mother "Daddy 
tells me he hates you but I love you, mom." And this shouldn't 
be happening. She's clearly having some emotional control here 
by the father and that really is terrible. \ I 
We also have Mr. Horton dropping in unannounced.*^7 The 
child, you know, he suggests the child calls him and says bring 
over my book or something. We need to have it very clearly 
understood that visitation is on the standard schedule or other 
times previously agreed, that he's not to just stop by the 
home. 
Number 7, maintain addresses and telephone numbers. 
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I think we've made that request clear. Restraint from 
derogatory comments in the presence of the child- We've 
requested bifurcation, I, you know, or to just move ahead to 
trial. Both of those would be great. 
And then Number 10, we've sought costs and fees in 
this matter. We're happy to reserve that for trial. We really 
are a little in the dark on the income issues as there's been 
no Financial Declaration. 
And then last, we would request contempt for the 
refusal to return the journals and the grandmother's property 
and I think since you did also include the Financial 
Declaration be ordered within 10 days of September 11, that's 
not been done, I would reiterate that we need that ASAP. But I 
think for that contempt we should be awarded sanctions and ^ 
attorney's fees for that. 
If I might approach and hand you the support 
worksheet. 
THE COURT: And counsel, for your review, it came to 
us, I believe it was this morning, it is a Financial 
Declaration affidavit of Mr. Horton. It's a very quick one 
page affidavit and in it he has a Financial Declaration. It 
looks like his monthly income is $1,183.58 if I'm reading it 
correctly. 
MS. MARELIUS: Okay. 
THE COURT: But he has provided that. I'll let you 
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look at this now and then we'll make a copy for you. 
MS. MARELIUS: Thank you, and I can just - maybe I'll 
take this back and (inaudible). Thank you. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Horton, your comments, sir. 
MR. HORTON: Well, it's a little difficult to 
memorize all that Tamrika's attorney has gone over. I'd like 
to take them line by line. 
THE COURT: Sir, I'm going to urge you as I urged 
everyone at the top of the hour, I have four minutes until the 
2:00 calendar starts and there's still another case to go. 
That means I'm going to have you go through this quickly. I 
have read what you've submitted, just tell me briefly if you 
have disagreements with what they've stated. If you do — 
MR. HORTON: Absolutely. 
THE COURT: - hit those points. 
MR. HORTON: Let's take the contempt charge. It 
bothers me the most. I was at Tamrika's home at the specified 
time, the specified date, she was not there. I left a note on 
the doorstep, said I leave tonight for California to finish my 
job, we'll have to take care of it. She never mentioned 
anything. I put in my affidavit to the Court that I would 
bring those to Court today. 
THE COURT: Do you have them with you? 
MR. HORTON: Of course, so that everything can be 
taken care of before Your Honor so that no longer can I be 
9 
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accused of — 
THE COURT: Do you have the videos? Do you also have* 
the videos, sir? 
MR. HORTON: Yes, I do. 
THE COURT: So you have journals, diaries and the 
photocopies of — 
MR. HORTON: Personal properties which belong to 
Tamrika and I do have, I also have a receipt for property which 
I've altered. I'd like her to initial that it agrees that 
she's received things back. I changed the dates of course 
because she was not available on the other day. 
It is true that I did work in California a good part 
of this summer. (inaudible) however, was with me for at least 
60 days of that time. Not being around, with Tamrika's having 
broken her leg, I've been doing all of the shuttling back and 
forth from Dagny to day care to Tamrika, to picking Tamrika up 
from her work or a class and taking her to her home, delivering 
Dagny at a time when it's convenient for Tamrika because of 
other obligations and no one else to take care of her. Of 
course, if there is ever a time when Tamrika cannot take care 
of her, I've always said that I am there to do so. The only 
exception is when I happen to be out of town working this past 
summer which is not an unusual thing. I don't go out of town 
like that necessarily for work. It has happened but this was a 
job for my sister and she was going through a difficult time 
10 
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and her husband had passed away. 
THE COURT: I don't need to hear about it- I just 
need you to stay very close to the facts. 
MR. HORTON: Okay. As far as custody, as far as 
getting a separation done, I'd like at this time to submit 
photocopies supporting the reason per the request for an 
annulment for the marriage. And I have a few things here which 
if you read over, starting with the first one where she names 
me by name as being a good candidate to marry, for getting into 
the country. 
THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Horton, on these issues, have 
you shown first of all these documents to counsel? Do you have 
a copy for her today? 
MR. HORTON: No. 
THE COURT: And the issue of an annulment is not 
before me today. That issue is something that will be 
determined at trial. 
MR. HORTON: My attorney passed away, excuse me for 
interrupting, but my attorney passed away. 
THE COURT: I know. 
MR. HORTON: These copies were all that's in the file 
that I received from him. I assumed that they had gone to 
opposing counsel at that time. I've been trying to get this 
thing happening since 1996 and for two years while Dagny was in 
my sole custody, Tamrika was going back and forth with an 
11 
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1 attorney, Mr. Allred, hiring him, firing him, hiring him and it 
2 put it off for years which you can read from the docket — 
3 THE COURT: Tell me about custody. Do you challenge 
4 her having sole custody? 
5 MR. HORTON: Yes, I do, Your Honor, and I seek to 
6 have this married annulled. I have an appointment with, not an 
7 appointment, but in two weeks I'll be meeting with immigration 
8 and her status is questionable. She does not have a valid 
9 status and therefore, I don't believe that custody should be 
10 awarded to someone who may be subject to deportation at their 
11 decision. According to one officer, she's out of status at 
12 this time and here illegally and subject to deportation. 
13 THE COURT: Okay. So that would be hearsay. 
14 MR. HORTON: She's not high on the priority list, 
15 however. So I still have custody to the best of my knowledge. 
16 She gave up custody three years ago when I first started this 
17 thing. I understand that only was valid for six months, I 
18 found out recently, but we have had this shared visitation. It 
19 is really difficult, emotional abuse toward my daughter from 
20 her mom. I can quote something last night. She — 
21 THE COURT: Sir, that would be hearsay. I don't want 
22 to hear that. 
23 MR. HORTON: Well, so is opposing counsel's statement 
24 on the same issue. 
25 J THE COURT: I want you to stay to the point. I'm 
12 
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getting what you're saying. 
MR. HORTON: Okay. Because of Tamrika's illegal 
status, possible illegal status, according to immigration law, 
she should not have custody of my child, our daughter, and 
therefore, I don't agree that the Court should give it up. 
I've always been there for my daughter. I had sole custody for 
two years while Tamrika was doing whatever else with her life 
and it wasn't until January of x98 when I was shot down when 
Judge Iwasaki was first assigned to this case and I first saw 
him. 
THE COURT: Sir, let me ask you a question. Where 
you live presently, is it a place that you are remodeling? 
MR. HORTON: No, I am not. When Dagny is with me, I 
live with my brother. He has a home up in Olympus. 
THE COURT: Okay. And so that's where you would go 
when you have the child? 
MR. HORTON: Yes, uh-huh (affirmative). 
THE COURT: Okay. 
MR. HORTON: And his children are there as well part 
of the time. He has only - so she has a good atmosphere. 
THE COURT: I've heard enough unless you have 
anything more, Mr. Horton? 
MR. HORTON: No, I suppose not. 
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you, sir. 
Counsel, I'm prepared to make a recommendation unless 
13 
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1 you have something further and I will let you review this and 
2 we can make a copy of this for the Court. 
3 Before the Court today is respondent's motion. She 
4 is seeking full custody. I'll note that this case has been 
5 going on what seems a lifetime. You've now been separated 
6 longer than your entire marriage. It continues to go on. It 
7 has to be greatly frustrating to everyone here. So that being 
8 the case, and I'm quite certain that Judge Iwasaki would 
9 request and want an update on the custody evaluation; 
10 therefore, since that looks like it is at least six to seven 
11 months off, minimum, and that's to start it, I'm going to 
12 address the custody issue and note that Judge Iwasaki very 
13 clearly left the issue of temporary custody up to the 
14 Commissioner and stated that earlier when he made his ruling on # 
15 January 23, '98. That being the case, the child is now five 
16 and a half. She is school age. A three day/four day swap 
17 between the two is not in the best interest of this child. It 
18 simply is not. That is not - stability building is not 
19 consistent. It is disruptive to a child that is school age at 
20 this point and I think I heard both of you agree to the same 
21 point there. 
22 MR. HORTON: Your Honor -
23 THE COURT: Sir, sit down. At this point I am giving 
24 my recommendation. If you have comments afterwards, I will 
25 entertain them, but not now. 
14 
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1 For the child's best interest, the stability favors 
2 the mother. She's in one place. She is financially stable. 
3 The father is self-employed, has moved around, has been in 
4 California this year, has had more than one residence on 
5 several occasions. Stability favors the mother so therefore 
6 she is granted the temporary sole custody of the minor child. 
7 The father will have the statutory visitation. He is to take 
8 the child when he has the child overnight to the brother's home 
9 which he stated is where he is enjoined, seeing the child when 
10 he has her. Child support shall be set according to the 
11 mother's income of $1,416 a month and the father's, I believe 
12 I've given you that copy, if memory serves me, it was $1,183, 
13 but if you will prepare a worksheet as to those numbers. Per 
14 statute you will divide any day case costs equally, the same as 
15 to medical insurance and uninsured. 
16 The issue of bifurcation, knowing that Judge Iwasaki 
17 will be adamant about a custody update, I see that there is no 
18 good reason not to bifurcate this. 
19 I .- —-MR. HORTON: What is the word? 
20 THE COURT: It's a bifurcated divorce, sir, and what 
21 that means is I'm going to grant that a decree of divorce be 
22 entered in this case and I know you're asking for an annulment 
23 and with that condition that later on it may be changed to a 
24 decree of annulment if you prove your case, sir. At this point 
25 in time, you may proceed and prepare the paperwork for a 
15 
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1 bifurcated decree of divorce. All issues in this case will be 
2 reserved to trial and specifically health insurance. You are 
3 not to change the coverage or effect one another's coverage 
4 effectuated through this bifurcation. Retirement issues, 
5 specifically a death benefit is not to be changed because of 
6 this bifurcation and lastly, the valuation of the marital 
7 estate is reserved until — 
8 MR. HORTON: The what? 
9 THE COURT: The valuation of the marital estate is 
10 reserved, sir. 
11 MR. HORTON: What does that mean? 
12 THE COURT: That means that anything that you have 
13 property wise is reserved until the time of trial. Otherwise, 
14 it would be for today and that doesn't make sense to me. You 
15 want it reserved until trial and that doesn't prejudice either 
16 of you. 
17 Moving on. There will be no attorney's fees for 
18 today. The issue of contempt I believe has been resolved. Mr, 
19 Horton has brought with him the journals, diaries, and tapes 
20 and I believe you can take those matters out in the hall, 
21 exchange them, and sign off on the various paperwork but it 
22 looks like it's been provided. I believe those are the issues 
23 that were asked for. 
24 Have I missed anything, Counsel? 
25 MS. MARELIUS: We did want a restraint, Your Honor 
16 
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from interference with the school and in the relationship 
between the parent and the child, restraint of derogatory 
comments, keep informed of address and phone. 
THE COURT: And all of those things are appropriate 
and it should be a mutual restraining order on derogatory 
comments. Neither of you should make comments like that to a 
child. You should both keep one another appraised and the 
Court of your address and phone numbers and certainly there 
should be no interference with the child at school and other 
relationships that she has with both of you. 
Thank you very much. 
MS. MARELIUS: I'll prepare an order. Thank you. 
THE COURT: Thank you. 
(Whereupon the hearing was concluded) 
(C) 
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MARTINS. TANNER 
Admitted to Practice Law in TELEPHONE: 
ARIZONA ATTORNEY AT LAW (801)575-7100 
CALIFORNIA 340 BROADWAY CENTER 
FACSIMILE: 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 111 EAST BROADWAY 
(801)575-7150 
UTAH SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-5250 
October 4,2001 
Walter Horton 
3357 Bernada Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Cell: (801)558-1276 
Work: (801) 428-1777 
Dear Walter: 
Enclosed, please find, as you requested, a copy of your file. You will also find a copy of my 
withdrawal as your counsel in this matter. I am withdrawing, immediately for several reasons. First, 
you do not seem to like my advice. You have told me that you wanted to fight for an annulment, 
despite the fact that a divorce decree was entered in this case before I was ever contacted by you. 
Judge Iwasaki was not about to revisit his decision to enter a divorce decree and made that clear 
several times. Had we tried, he indicated in chambers to me and Suzanne Marelius at the pretrial 
conference that he would likely award costs and fees to your former wife. Second, you seem to want 
to revisit the stipulation agreed upon in open court. This cannot be done. Third, although I have told 
you that if your former wife is not acting as ordered in the supplemental decree of divorce, especially 
with respect to the advisory guidelines in connection with visitation, you have not taken my advice 
to schedule a hearing and take her back to court. Fourth, you are behind in your financial 
obligations. 
Walter, I sympathize with your situation. You obviously care a great deal about your 
daughter and I hope you can have more time with her in the future. I wish you all the best in your 
future endeavors. 
Very truly yours, 
MST/as 
C:\l\Domcstic\HonotiWalicrxWuIierHorton Leiicr2.upd 
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Admitted to Practice Law in 
ARIZONA 
CALIFORNIA 
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
UTAH 
MARTINS. TANNER 
ATTORNEY AT LAW 
340 BROADWAY CENTER 
111 EAST BROADWAY 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111-5250 
August 3, 2001 
TELEPHONE: 
(801)575-7100 
FACSIMILE: 
(801)575-7150 
Walter Horton 
3357 Bernada Drive 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Cell: (801)558-1276 
Work: (801) 428-1777 
Dear Walter: 
Our offices have received in the mail a copy of the proposed Supplemental Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law and Decree of Divorce from Suzanne Marelius. They appear to me to be 
consistent with the stipulation we reached in court to settle your case. If you would like to personally 
review them, please contact me so that you can come in and review them. I will hold them until I 
hear from you. We have ten days from the date of this letter to object if you believe they are not 
consistent with our agreement. 
Very truly yours, 
MST/as 
C:\l\Doniesiic\HononWalter\WalterHorton.LeiterI 
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To: Walter J. Horton December 20,2001 
I These are my recollections of your discussion and events with your attorney Martin Tanner in the pre-trial room on 
I June 29,2001. Also present was D. Troy Horton, my other son, 
j Walter was expecting to go to trial for physical custody of his daughter, Dagny Alexandria. Horton. He was also asking 
^- for an annulment of his marriage to Tamriko Khvtjsiashvili. 
:? Walters representing attorney Mr. Taimar was insistent that Walter give up en fee annulment portion because "this 
^ Judge won't make a bastard of Dagny," 
li Walter bad understood that the custody cvaluator would be in court. He had not been subpoenaed. The custody 
' cvaluator had seen a school drawing by Dagny showing hcr-self wanting to live with her Dad. 
The final assurance in regard to custody was that Walter would have Dagny anytime Tamriko was not able to be with 
5 her, "In other words, Dagny would be with Walter rather than being left with, grandma, Mom's boyfriend or an outside 
caretaker" when Tamriko works late or is unable to be with Dagny. "The father has preference over other care givers." 
Walter feeling comfortable that Dagny would have more consistency in her life with the above arrangement of care, 
y agreed to Dagny being with either her mother or himself. Attorney Tanner also stated that with standardized visitation 
Walter would have Dagny 1/3 of the time. 
There was a discussion as to the legal term for the disillusion of marriage with Mr. Tanner stating it would be 
"irreconcilable differences" and Walter feeling fraud or adultery should be indicated. Walter, recognizing he was losing 
each of his concerns without being heard on any of his areas of facts was reluctant to accept "divorce." The attorney 
"J stated that if he goes to trail it would be $5-6,000 in court costs and attorney fees. The attorney was not willing to 
' present any of the facts Walter had of evidence because the "Judge was not interested/' He stated he would get 
r Walter's documents filed with the proceeding's documents so they would be apart of the court records. This was 
reluctantly acceptable to Walter. 
Finally child support was addressed. Child support was to be based on Walter's income of $800 per month. Child 
£f support would be for the maintenance of Dagny, her child care and health insurance. Back child support was brought 
up with Walter asking about the two years that he was the provider and received no financial support. 
i In the court room Attorney Tanner began by saying an agreement had been readied without verbally spelling out what was agreed upon. At no time in the court proceedings were the areas of agreement from the pre-trial room verbalized. 
Walter is an excellent parent His concern is for Dagny's well being and her ability to grow to a well adjusted healthy 
j s\ adult. He has not kept Dagny from Tamriko or her grandmother as evidenced by the period when he was the sole 
caretaker from the time she was one to three years old. He felt it was important for Dagny to know her Mom so he took 
Dagny to Tamriko and grandma. 
Walter's attorney was insistent that Walter would not get custody of Dagny, saying there was no reason for the Judge to 
change custody. Walter felt he should never have lost custody in die first place and wanted to be heard in this area. 
Attorney Tanner was in and out of the pre-trial room which made it difficult to maintain a flow of discussion. There 
was a tremendous sense that the Judge was annoyed by the length of time it was taking to come to agreement and 
further delays would only make him angrier. This time consuming process would make the Judge find against Walter 
and any of Walter's fa^s would not be receivedjavorably. 
Submitted by: 
i/ 
KathalTifte L, Horton 
916/780-5441 
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12-19-01 
Re: June 29th 2001 Client Conference 
To Whom It May Concern: 
I, Troy Horton, was present on June 29th, 2001 in a conference between Walter Horton 
and Martin Tanner (attorney) on the details of the decree of divorce, as well as with my 
mother Katharine L. Horton. 
It was clearly promised in that conference that the decree would be written up with the 
stipulation that Walter would be the first right of refusal to care for Dagny in the event 
that her mother was unavailable. It was made very clear that Walters fear was that once 
7 the divorce was final that if it was not in writing that the mother would take away that 
right and place Dagny in the care of Dagny's grandmother on her mothers side. Mr. 
Tanner assured Walter he would read the stipulations to the Judge to ensure that 
happened. 
I know the issues and concerns of Walter, which were many (i.e. the above, reason for the 
divorce being annulment not irreconcilable differences-divorce, child support, phone 
contact, school involvement etc), and with each one that was brought up the attorney 
chided Walter and told him that the Judge was not going to rule in his favor on some of 
those issues stating, "that the court was not going to make a bastard out of the child and 
therefore an annulment was not going to be permitted, and that if he didn't agree to the 
decree as it currently stood with a few minor modifications that he would likely loose the 
•^ chance to get the simple things as well." It was clear to me that Mr. Tanner was trying to 
pressure Walter into just folding and giving in. I spoke up at that point and told Mr. 
Tanner that I didn't personally think the Judge cared if it took 30 minutes or 2 hours to 
negotiate and work out the details. This decree is a forever document and if it is going to 
take a few extra minutes to get it right then so be it. All parties need to have the patience 
to do what is right and fair. Mr. Tanner then addressed the issues Walter wanted and 
wrote them down on his note pad to discuss with Tamrika's attorney as stipulations to be 
entered in the decree. 
v 
Not all of the stipulations Walter requested were even read to the Judge and before long it 
was over and in the hallway Walter was in tears wondering what just happened, feeling 
he'd been railroaded into the divorce leaving him without custody when clearly in my 
mind he should have never lost it in the firstplace. 
Sincen 
D. Troy Horton 
jQANNER 
2091Br§ntUnt 
^attLakt City, Utah 84121 
MyCommlwtonExpkw 
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Rule 1.4. Communication. 
' (a) A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed about the 
• status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests 
for information. 
Rule 3.3. Candor toward the tribunal. 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(1) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a tribunal; 
Rule 3.3. Candor toward the tribunal. 
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly: 
(4) Offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. If a lawyer 
has offered material evidence and comes to know of its falsity, 
the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures. 
Rule 4.1. Truthfulness in statements to others. 
• In the course of representing a client a lawyer shall not 
».Knowingly: 
(a) Make a false statement of material fact or law to a third 
person; or 
(b) Fail to disclose a material fact to a third person when 
disclosure is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or 
fraudulent act by a client, unless disclosure is prohibited by 
Rule 1.6. 
Rule 4-911. Motion and order for payment of costs and fees. 
(2) The court may grant the motion if the court finds that: 
(A) the moving party lacks the financial resources to pay the 
costs and fees; 
(C) the costs and fees are necessary for the proper prosecution 
or defense of the action; and 
Pi 
* JTAH RULES OF EVIDENCE 
ARTICLE I. GENERAL PROVISIONS 
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Rule 5. Service and filing of pleadings and o ther papers. 
'(a) Service: When required. 
(1) Except as otherwise provided in these rules or as otherwise 
directed by the court, every judgment, every order required by its terms to be 
served, every pleading subsequent to the original complaint, every paper relating to 
discovery, every written motion other than one which may be heard ex parte, and 
every written notice, appearance, demand, offer of judgment, and similar paper 
shall be served upon each of the parties. 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 37. Failure to make or cooperate in discovery; sanctions. 
(fj Failure to disclose. If a party falls to disclose a witness, document or other 
material as required by Rule 26(a) or Rule 26(e)(1), or to amend a prior response to 
discovery as required by Rule 26(e)(2), that party shall not be permitted to use the 
witness, document or other material at any hearing unless the failure to disclose is 
harmless or the party shows good cause for the failure to disclose. In addition to or 
in lieu of this sanction, the court may order any other sanction, including payment 
of reasonable costs and attorney fees, any order permitted under 
' subpart (b)(2)(A), (B) or (C) and informing the jury of the failure to disclose. 
PART I. JUDICIAL COUNCIL RULES OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 
CHAPTER 13. Rules of PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT. 
Rule 1.1. Competence. 
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. 
Competent representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, 
thoroughness, and preparation reasonably necessary for the 
representation. 
Rule 1.2. Scope of representation. 
(a) A lawyer shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the 
objectives of representation, subject to paragraphs (b), (c), (d), 
and shall consult with the client as to the means by which they 
are to be pursued. A lawyer shall abide by a client's decision 
whether to accept an offer of settlement of a matter. In a 
criminal case, a lawyer shall abide by the client's decision, 
pafter consultation with the lawyer, as to a plea to be entered, 
whether to waive jury trial and whether the client will testify. 
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^These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in 
"administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, 
and promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to 
the end that the truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly 
determined. 
Rule 502* Husband-wife. 
(4) Exceptions. No privilege exists under subparagraph (b) of this 
rule; 
(B) Furtherance of crime or tort. As to any communication which 
was made, in whole or in part, to enable or aid anyone 
(ill) to conceal a crime or a tort; 
Federal Rules of Evidence 
Ar t i c l e ! 
Rule 102. Purpose and Construct ion 
* These rules shall be construed to secure fairness in 
administration, elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay, and 
promotion of growth and development of the law of evidence to the end that the 
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly determined. 
75 American Jurisprudence 2d 
Section 133: 
At first blush, a materimonial action would appearr to be most susceptible to 
bifurcation. In most such actions, a point is reached where there is no real dispute 
over ending the marriage itself, Most divorce actions could be settled if it were not 
for the task of resolving the ancillary issues such as custody...... 
Accordingly, while bifurcation is an attractive procedural device in many tort 
proceedings, such is not the case in matrimonial distutes. 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
